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OCS LEASING AND AUCTIONS:
INCENTIVES AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVE
BIDDING INSTITUTIONS
James C. Cox*
R. Mark Isaac**
Vernon L. Smith***
In Wattv. EnergyActionEducationalFoundation,theSupreme
Court
rebutted
a challenge
to thefederal
mixof "nontraditional"
outer
government's
continental
authorized
mechanisms
under
the1978OCSAmendshelflease-auction
ments.
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performance.
On December 1, 1981, the Supreme Court decided Wattv. Energy
Action
Educational
The suitwas based on theOuter ContinenFoundation.'
tal Shelf Lands Act Amendmentsof 1978.2 The plaintiffs,
includingthe
StateofCaliforniaand severalconsumergroups,had broughtsuitagainst
the Secretaryof the Interior,askingfora declaratoryjudgment thatthe
governmentalentitiesinvolvedhad abused theirlegislateddiscretionin
not experimenting
withbiddingsystemsthatuse otherthancash bonuses
as bidding variables.The plaintiffs
also asked foran injunctionagainst
furtherouter continentalshelf (hereinafterOCS) lease sales until new
regulationshad been issued forthealternativesystems,and fora prohibitionof further
sales based on a fixed-royalty
and variablecash-bonusbid.
This essay examinessome economic aspects of alternativeauctionmarketinstitutions,
withspecial referenceto alternativemethodsforthe
auctioningof oil and gas explorationand developmentrightson OCS
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lands. Our discussion is motivatedby some of the economic aspects of
the issues raised in EnergyAction,and we offersome analyses of the
dimensionsof the OCS leases. But,
implicationsof bidding on different
the economic and methodologicalissues that this case raises are much
broader than the particularbidding systemsinvolved.These issues include questions concerningwhatconstitutesan experiment,whatcan be
learned fromexperiments,what incentivesalternativeauction institutionsprovide forthe bidders,and how these incentivesaffectthe resulting prices and allocations.3
Section I brieflyreviewssome of the issues raised in the pleadings
and in the Court's decision. Section II evaluatescertaintheoreticalpropertiesof the alternativeauction rules,withparticularemphasison some
theoreticalimplicationsof thesealternativesforthedevelopmentof OCS
leases. The original legislation,the Departmentof Energyregulations,
the litigants'pleadings,and the Supreme Court's rulingall raise fundamental methodological issues regarding the empirical evaluation of
hypothesesabout the relative meritsof alternativeauction processes.
Consequently,Section III exploresan issue implicitin thewordingof the
original legislation,namely the evaluation of auctions in some kind of
"field" experimentundertakenby the federal government.Section III
also explores some genericlimitationson any such fieldinquiry.Section
IV discusses an alternativemethod of evaluating auction institutions,
namelythe use of laboratoryexperiments.Laboratoryexperimentsare
complementary,and, we argue, in some respects superior,to fieldexperimentation.We presentexamples fromthe existingexperimentalliterature on auction markets for two purposes: to demonstratewhat
researchershave alreadylearnedabout auctionmarketsin thelaboratory,
and to suggestwhatotherkindsof issues directlyrelevantto OCS leasing
mightbe amenable to laboratorytesting.Sections III and IV provide
importantmethodological and empirical background for furtherexof OCS leasing. Finalperimentationbased on the special characteristics
ly, Section V offerssome concludingcomments.
I. LEGISLATIVE GOALS AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A. General Overview
The policies at issue in Energy
have theirgenesis in theOuter
Action
ContinentalShelfLands ActAmendmentsof 1978 (hereinafter,
the 1978
Amendments).4In this legislation Congress directed that the federal
governmentexperimentwithseveral "nontraditional"methodsof auctioningOCS oil and gas leases. The term"nontraditional"meansthatthe
methodsdifferfromthe historicallyprevalentcash-bonusbid, fixed-royalty-rateauction.
The nine nontraditionalsystemsspecifiedin the legislationare:
1. cash-bonus bid withdiminishingroyaltyrate;
2. cash-bonus bid withfixedprofitshare;
44
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3.

cash-bonus bid withboth a fixedroyaltyrate and a fixedprofit
share;
4. royaltyrate bid witha fixedcash bonus;
5. royaltyrate bid witha fixedworkcommitmentforexploration;
6. royaltyrate bid withboth a fixedworkcommitmentand a fixed
cash bonus;
7. profitshare bid witha fixedcash bonus;
8. work-commitment
bid witha fixedcash bonus and a slidingscale
royaltyrate;
9. work-commitment
bid witha fixedcash bonus and a fixedroyalty
rate.
In 1979 a group oflitigants,includingtheState ofCalifornia(which
receives a share of OCS revenues), the City of Long Beach, California
(whichhas a stakein some nonfederaloffshoreoil lands), severalconsumer groups,and threeprivatecitizensbegan legal action to alter the mix
of the alternativesystemsthatthe federalgovernmenthad adopted.5 By
1981 the governmenthad used nontraditionalauctions on leases covering 49 percentof the totalarea offered,but thisprogramhad used only
twoof the nine alternatives,both involvinga cash-bonusbid. The plaintiffs
also soughtan injunctionbarringfurther
lease sales untilthegovernmentpromulgatednew regulationsforusingall of thealternativeauction
mechanisms.
The courtof appeals joined the districtcourtin refusingto issue a
series of injunctionsagainst scheduled lease sales, but it ruled that the
legislationrequiredtheSecretaryoftheInteriorto experimentwithsome
of the auctions not using the cash bonus as the bidding variable.6The
Secretaryand others appealed, and the Supreme Court sided withthe
government,holdingthat,"[i]t is not forus, or forthe Court of Appeals,
to decide whetherthe Secretaryof the Interioris well advised to forgo
experimentationwiththe non-cash-bonusalternatives."7
The Court's rulingturnedin part on the narrowquestion of interpretingcongressionallanguage directingthattwentyto sixtypercentof
leases were to be sold using nontraditionalauctions.8The government's
aggregateusage of the variousnontraditionalauctionswas clearlywithin
those bounds, withnontraditionalmethodsbeing used on 49 percentof
the totalarea offeredup to thattime.AlthoughtheSecretaryhad chosen
only those alternativesusing a cash-bonus bid, the Court held thathis
action was within the legislation's requirements. Nevertheless, the
Court's rulingdid partlyconsider the economic and legal intentionsof
the Congress in passing the 1978 Amendments.And, it is Congress's
economic intentionsthatwe brieflyreviewhere.
In directingthe Secretaryto use the nontraditionalmethods on at
least twentypercentof the tractsat auction,and in allowingtheiruse on
up to sixtypercent of the tractsat auction, Congress was apparently
askingthatthese systemsbe triedout, withoutcommittingthe government to a complete abandonment of the cash-bonus bid, fixed-royalty
45
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system.Considering the legislation'sextensiverequirementsforthe executive branch to reportto Congress on the new systems,we interpret
of the
thiscongressionalactionas a desire to compare therelativeefficacy
various biddingmechanismsin achievingsome set of policyobjectives.9
Both the legislationand the committeereportspresenta fairlyconsistent statementof congressional goals.'0 In the legislation we find,
among others,the followingfourpurposes:
1. To make [OCS] resources available to meet the Nation's energy
needs as rapidlyas possible;
2. To balance orderlyenergyresourcedevelopmentwithprotection
of the human, marine,and coastal environments;
3. To insure the public of a fairand equitable returnon the resources of the Outer ContinentalShelf;
4. To preserveand maintainfreeenterprisecompetition."
In a latersection,thelegislationdirectsthat"[l]easingactivities
shallbe conducted to assure receiptof fairmarketvalue forthe lands leased and the
rightsconveyedbythe FederalGovernment."'2
The Conference Report lists goals that should be taken into account, includingbut not limitedto:
1. Providinga fairreturnto the Federal Government;
2. Increasing competition;
3. Assuringcompetentand safe operations;
4. Avoiding undue speculation;
5. Avoiding unnecessarydelays in exploration,development,and
production;
6. Discoveringand recoveringoil and gas;
7. Developing new oil and gas resources in an efficient
and timely
manner;
8. Limitingadministrativeburdens on governmentand industry.'3
Even thoughmanyof thewordsused in theseobjectivesare familiar
to economists,evaluating the bidding processes in theirlightpresents
two difficulties.
First,operationalizingtheirmeaning in the contextof
OCS leasing must be as precise and unambiguous as possible. Second,
even ifthe implicationsof the biddingprocesses are clear, theremaybe
inconsistenciesin the goals, which generate a considerationof policy
trade-offs.
To illustratethese problems, let us consider in some detail the
objective thatappears repeatedlythroughoutthe Court's decision, the
gaining of "fair marketvalue" for the leases.'4 That phrase, or some
variantof it,is issued at least nineteentimesin the textand footnotesof
the Court's decision. But, what does it mean?
First,thereis some ambiguityin thelegislationregardingthedefinition of the commodityfor which the governmentis to obtain a "fair
marketvalue." The obvious answer is "a mineral lease" with a "fair
marketvalue" definedat the timeof the lease's sale. This is an obvious
answer,because the governmentis explicitlynot in the business of pro46
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ducing and recoveringits own oil, even though it may retaina royalty
right.Instead, what the federal governmentis selling is the right to
extractand sell oil apd gas fromgovernment-owned
property.As theAct
states,it is thislease and the "rightsconveyed" thatCongress desires to
be sold at a "fairmarketvalue."5 The use of the term"market"value
confirmstheinterestin thevalue at thetimethatthegovernmentmarkets
the commodity,the lease. This is whateconomistswould call the valuation of the tractexanteits development,thatis, beforethe revelationof
thetruevalue of theuncertainvariablesin theeconomic calculation,such
as the futureprice of oil and gas, the tract'sgeological productivity,
and
so forth.The exantepoint of view findsthisuncertaintyreflectedin the
lease's "fairmarketvalue."
The "Definitions"sectionl6 of the legislationis not veryhelpfulin
pinningdown Congress's use of the term"fair marketvalue," for the
termis definedonly in the contextof the mineralsproduced fromthe
lease afterthatproductionhas actuallyoccurred:
The term"fairmarketvalue" means the value of any mineral...
computed at a unit price equivalent to the average unit price at
whichsuch mineralwas sold pursuantto a lease duringthe period
forwhichany royaltyor net profitshare is accrued or reservedto
the United States pursuantto such lease .... .7
Economistscall thisvalue the expostaverage valuationof theminerals. Of course,therewillbe a connectionbetweenthe expected
expostvalue
of themineralsand the exantevalue of thelease, althoughothervariables,
such as the rules of the lease, will also affectvalue. But, the "fairvalue"
of the lease at the time that it is marketedis distinctfromthe expost
realizationof the unknownvariables.This distinctionoccurs in the same
way thata house sold in 1950 had a well-definedfairmarketvalue for
1950, regardlessof its value in 1983.
of congressionalintent,based on
Indeed, a generousinterpretation
theConferenceReport'sdiscussionof thedefinitions,'8
is thatthelegislatorsneverintendedthis expostlanguage to apply to thatpart of the Act
concerningleases,'9 but onlyto othersectionsof the legislationdiscussing the downstreammarketingof theoil and gas products.20Other parts
of the same Conference Report seem more ambiguous.
We remainunconvincedthatone can rule out completelythatCongress was operatingwitha pictureof the "fairmarketvalue" of governmentOCS leases thatwas related to theactual expostrealizedvalue of the
minerals.21Nevertheless,whicheverinterpretationof congressionalintent in the "definitions"section of the Amendmentsis correct really
makesverylittledifferenceforthe discussionhere. The governmentcan
be assured of obtainingthe equivalentof the expostaverage price of the
oil and gas onlyifit retainsownershipof all of the minerals,and consequently,of all of the geological riskand the riskof oil- and gas-price
fluctuations.This retentionof rightsis inconsistentwiththe idea of the
leasing of governmentproperties.Therefore,we assume thatit is the ex
47

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Tue, 12 Jan 2016 16:22:19 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SupremeCourtEconomicReview

antefairmarketvalue of the lease thatinterestsCongress. The nextstep
is to pin down the word "fair."
In at least seven of the nineteeninstancesin whichthe Court uses
the term"fairmarketvalue" or some similarphrase, it is in conjunction
22This conjunctionraises
withsome referenceto theterm"competition.""
the question of whetherCongress and the courtsview the "fairmarket
value" of a lease as theprice thatwould obtain in a perfectly
competitive
marketforleases. Such a linkagewould be paradoxical,because a striking
featureof the marketfor OCS leases is that the federal government
dominatesin the controlof the remainingdomesticsources of potential
oil- and gas-bearinglands, withall of theattendantpowers to limitquantities,to increase the returnsthataccompanythispower.23We seriously
doubt that the Congress wishes the Secretaryto act as though he is
ignorantof thegovernment'ssellingpower.One should restrictattention
to models of the marketforleases thatreflectthisreality.Therefore,we
view the marketforleases as a series of perhaps simultaneousauctions
fora single,indivisibleunitof a unique commodity,withthesellerdeterminingthe numberand timingof such sales.
There is substantialevidence to suggestthatthe intentof Congress
is to equate "fair marketvalue" with"greatest possible expected revenue." The House Reportexplicitlyuses thephrase "higherreturnsto the
publicTreasury."24The standinggrantedtheState ofCaliforniain Energy
Actionis based in part on the claim of injuryto Californiashould the
auctions not produce a "fair marketvalue,"25 because by statutethat
value is shared withCalifornia.Of course, we findno evidence in the
Court's decision of California articulatinga notion of any harm that
would befallit should the auctionsyieldit an "unfairly"large amountof
money.
If the preceding interpretationof "fair marketvalue" is correct,
then the nature of the issue in this "experiment" is thus. Each of the
bidding-leasesystemswill cause each firmto calculate its most advantageous bid. Interalia, thisbid willdepend on how manyfirmsare bidding,
whatthe firmexpects otherfirmsto do, whatit believes about theuncertain futurevariables, and what the firmsees as its optimal patternof
development if it wins the auction and must pay some bonus, royalty,
profitshare, or workcommitmentaccording to the auction's rules. The
same set of variables,as reflectedin each firm'sbid, yields the federal
governmentat the completion of the auction a discounted stream of
expected returns,V. This Vis composed of some combinationof a cash
bonus, royalty,or profitshare, depending on the auction's rules. The
question that Congress seems to be asking is, "which of the endorsed
biddingschemesgeneratesthehighesttotalof Vsacross thetractsexpected to be auctioned of"?.
Notice that V will depend greatlyon the productionplan thatthe
lease's termsinduce the auction winnerto adopt. As Section II explains,
the lease's downstreampaymenttermsaffectthewinningfirm'sdevelop48
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mentplans.26Therefore,suppose thatfora given productionschedule,
a particularwinningroyaltybid, and a particularwinningbonus bid, a
bid auctionapparentlyyieldthe
cash-bonus-bidauctionand a royalty-rate
same values of V.We cannotassertthatthetwolease rules in generalwill
because theywillcommonly
returnthesame level of Vto thegovernment,
induce different
productionpatterns.
of "fairmarketvalue." An
There are otherpossible interpretations
criterionjust discussed
alternativeto the "highest-revenue-generating"
would be to require that the auction be fully"demand revealing." An
auction is demand revealingifeach firm'sbid fullyrepresentsthe maximumamountthatitwould be willingto pay,giventherules of thelease.
Combined withthe congressionaldirectivethatthe lease be awarded to
the highestbidder, a demand-revealingauction has two importantimplications.First,the lease will be awarded to the firmthatvalues it the
most,whichmeans thatthe lease allocation is efficient.
Second, the winning bid correctlyreveals to the governmentthe maximumthat any
biddingfirmis willingto pay forthe lease.
If demand revelation is the intentof Congress in seeking "fair
marketvalue," then the menu of congressionallyendorsed auction processes leaves much to be desired, because all of the alternativeprocedures are being operationalized as "first-price,"sealed-bid auctions,
those in whichthe lease is awarded to the highestbidding firm,which
pays the amount that it bid. A well-knownpropertyof such auctions
under conditionsof uncertainty
is thattheyare not demand-revealing.27
The winningbid in such auctions generallywillnot reflectthemaximum
willingnessto pay among the bidders. Section IV containsdiscussionof
thekindsof auctionsthatcan be demand-revealingand of theproperties
of such auctions.28
A fourthpossible interpretationof "fair marketvalue" is a sales
pricethatjust exhaustsall of thepotentialwillingnessto pay of thelosing
bidders.To demonstratethe implicationsof thisrequirement,suppose
thatit does not hold. Then, at the momentof the auction's completion,
thereexistsat least one losing bidder who, at the limit,would be willing
to purchase the lease fromthe winnerat a price greaterthan what the
winnerpaid to theoriginalseller.Therefore,in a sense thewinnerwould
have expropriatedsome residual value fromthe government.
For example,suppose thata first-price
auction (an auctionin which
the winnerpays whathe bids) is held in whichthe highestprivatevaluation of the object among losing bidders is $10. If the winningbid were
less than $10, then the "high-value" losing bidder has a limit-demand
price greaterthan the price thatthe originalseller received.Thus, $10
is the knife-edgevalue thatjust exhausts the value of all losing bidders.
Whethertheauction'swinnerpotentiallywould be willingto resellat the
highestlosingbidder'slimit-demandpricedepends on his own valuation.
If it is greaterthan$10, thenhe would not. If it is less than$10, thenhe
would. Notice thatan auction in whichthewinningbid does not exhaust
49
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the willingnessto pay of all losing bidders has two problems.Not only
maythe object be sold to one bidderforless thanitsopportunitycost (in
thisexample, $10), but also such an auction allows the object possiblyto
be awarded initiallyinefficiently
(thatis, to a bidder who does not value
it the most). As Section IV explains,thereexist auctions thatobtain this
auctions.29
concept of "fair marketvalue" and thatare not first-price
There maybe trade-offs
betweenanyone of theseconceptsof "fair
marketvalue" and any of the other congressional goals. For example,
overly rapid production from an oil field can damage the geological
structure'sinternaldrives.Thus, makingresources available "as rapidly
as possible" may not be "efficientand timely,"nor may it yield the
government'smaximumexpected return.
B. The BenchmarkAuction Process
Beforeexaminingeconomic implicationsof the nontraditionalauctions,consider the followingbenchmark.Both the respondentsand the
Court in Energy
Action
emphasizethata commonfeaturethatdistinguishes
the nontraditionalmechanismsthat the Secretaryhad employed is the
use of a cash bonus as the bidding variable. The respondentsbelieved
cash-bonus bidding to be an inherentlyundesirable feature.30Let us
consider the polar extreme case of auctions with such a feature:the
first-price,
pure cash-bonus-bid auction, with no subsequent royalty,
rental,or profitshare. Althoughit is not on the list of congressionally
approved auctions,the first-price,
pure bonus-bid auction can serveas a
useful referencepoint, highlightingthe implicationsof an auction that
come fromthe featuresof the first-price-award
rule of bonus bidding.
Economistshave extensivelystudied the first-price,
pure bonus-bid
auction.31An importantcomponent of any model of auction decision
makingis the descriptionof what the bidders knowabout the object at
auctionand about each other.This componentis called the"information
structure."Several different
information
structureshave been examined,
the most relevantto thisdiscussionbeing the so-called "mineral-rights"
In the mineral-rights
structure.32
structure,the object at auction,in this
case, an OCS lease, has an unknownvalue, x,to anywinningbidder.This
value is revealed as thefieldis developed. Each bidder (firm)knowssome
public (common-knowledge)informationabout x and enjoys some privateinformation
or signalabout x,called s,.All firmsknowthateach firm's
is
drawn
s,
independentlyfroma distributionrelatingsignals to the true
tractvalue, x. No firmknows any other firm'ssi .
There are fourimportantaspects of thefirst-price,
pure cash-bonusbid auction in the mineral-rights
informationstructure.First,theauction
generallyis not demand-revealing.Each firmcommonlyhas an incentive
to bid less than its maximumwillingnessto pay. This propertyderives
fromthe first-price
natureof the auction and the informationstructure,
and it does not require thatthe cash bonus be the bidding variable.33
Second,the relationshipbetween the number of firmssubmitting
50
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bids and the winningbid is much more complex than the hypothesized
connectionimplicitin muchof the congressionalcommentary.The connection between "increased competition"and "higher returns"34suggests thatCongress conceived of a verysimple relationshipbetween the
observed numberof bidders and the government'sreceipts,withmore
"competition,"a larger number of firmsbidding,yieldinghigher "returns."In some cases a givenfirm'smostadvantageous bid willincrease
as thenumberof biddersincreases.But, in othercases it falls.Nevertheless, underfairlygeneralconditionsthewinningbid getsveryclose to the
true value of x as the number of bidders gets verylarge. Again, this
auctionrulesand theinformaphenomenonis a functionof thefirst-price
tion structure,and its analog could also be observed withbiddingvariables other than the cash bonus.35
thewinningbidder in thisidealized benchmarkauctionviews
Third,
hispaymentto thegovernment,thecash bonus,as a sunkcost in developThis treatmentof the bonus induces an efficient
ing the tract.36
development programfor the tract.This is a featureof the pure cash-bonus
sealednatureof thepayment,and itwould hold in otherthanfirst-price,
bid auctions.
all of the developmentriskfallson the winningbidder and
Fourth,
none of it on the government.This also is a featureof the pure cashsealed-bid
bonus payment,and it would hold in other than first-price,
auctions.
These four aspects of the benchmarkauction process provide a
usefulcomparisonwiththerealitiesof thetencongressionallyauthorized
bidding systems.A finalcaution to be kept in mind is thatvirtuallyall
theoreticalstudies involve a common simplifyingassumption,namely
thateach tractgeneratesa demand schedule thatis independentof the
outcomes of auctions of other tracts.In reality,each OCS-lease sale
consistsof simultaneousauctionsof severaltracts.Because a bidder may
viewthetractsas substitutesor complementsforone another,his willingness to pay forone tractmaynot be independentof theauctionoutcome
on the other tracts.In thatcase, the bidder faces a more difficult
combinatorialproblem than is usuallymodeled.37
II. PROPERTIES OF AUCTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE 1978
AMENDMENTS
All of the auctions thatthe 1978 Amendmentsauthorizedare firstprice or highest-rateauctions. Therefore, they all share the common
genericincentivepropertyof such auctions:each bidderhas an incentive
to under-revealhisdemand,thatis, to submita bid such thattheexpected
present discounted value of his total up-frontand downstreamlease
paymentsis less than he thinksthatthe lease is worthwhen he submits
his bid. Althoughall of theseauctionsshare theunder-revelation
property,theydo not necessarilyshare it equally.Thus, some of the authorized
51
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auctionsmayprovidebidderswithquantitatively
more significant
underrevelationincentivesthan do others. But, the theoreticaland empirical
researchthatwould be required to discern the comparativequantitative
propertiesof these auctions has not been done.
A second incentivepropertyof these auctions is interrelatedwith,
but distinctfrom,the demand under-revelationincentive;itis thenature
of the exploration and development incentivesfor a winningbidder
contained in a lease's downstream-payment
terms.We discuss these incentivepropertieshere.
Before passage of the 1978 Amendments,royaltyrates were often
set at 121/2or 162/%
percent,whichled to highest-bonusbids submitted
in the traditionalauction thatvariedbetweenzero, on tractsthatdrewno
dollars.Presumably,thezero-bidtracts
bids,and severalhundred-million
were ones about whichlittlewas knownor forwhichthe available informationwas unfavorable.Each ofthe tractsthatdrewlargebonus bids was
obviously thoughtto be quite valuable by at least one bidder. Much
attentionhas been focused on theverylarge winningbonus bids and the
implicationsof the size of the bonuses forthe numberof qualifiedbidding entitiescapable of bearingrisksof thatmagnitude.It is commonly
argued that only a few of the largest oil companies can bear riskson
individualtractsof thesize impliedbymanywinningbids and thatsmaller
qualifiedbidders are individuallyexcluded and able to compete only if
theycan combine intojoint biddingsyndicates.The resultis a relatively
small number of bidders, on the order of three per leased tract.This
outcome has been interpretedas a lack of "competition" forthe leases,
whichis alleged to reduce public revenues fromlease sales and to lead
to increased concentrationin OCS oil and gas production.
The congressionalcommitteereportsexpress the hope that,relativeto use of the traditionalauction,the adoption of some of the newly
authorized auctions would lead to a substitutionof downstreampaymentsforup-frontpaymentson leases. The rationaleforseekingsuch a
substitutionapparentlywas a beliefthatlowerbonuses and higherdownstreampaymentswould increase the numberof bidding entitiesin serious contentionforleases and thatthisincreasewould enhance totallease
revenuesand diminishconcentrationin OCS oil and gas production.But,
professionalresearchdoes not fullysupport these beliefs.For example,
the alleged positive relationshipbetween lease sales revenues and the
numberof bidders has been challenged.38But, since increasingthenumber of bidding entities by diminishingup-frontlease paymentswas a
rationaleforrequiringtheuse ofalternativeauctionsin the 1978 Amendments,we now compare auctions in these terms.
A. AuthorizedCash-Bonus-Bid Auctions
The 1978 Amendmentsauthorize four cash-bonus-bidauctions.
One such auction is the fixed-royalty-rate,
cash-bonus-bidauction that
was used to auction most OCS leases in earlieryears.The otherauthor52
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ized bonus-bidauctions differfromthe familiarone in the wayin which
the contingentdownstreampaymentsare calculated.The threealternativedownstream-payment
termsare: (1) diminishingor sliding-scaleroynot less than 121/2percent;(2) fixedshare
at
rate
a
altyrate,beginning
of net profits,not less thanthirtypercent;and (3) fixed-royalty
rate,not
less than 121/2
percentand fixedshare of net profits,not less than thirty
percent.
The Departmentof Energy(hereinafterDOE) issued finalregulationsforthefixed-and sliding-scaleroyalty-rate
auctionsthathave these
rate,and
provisions.39One auction has a cash-bonusbid, a fixed-royalty
an annual rentalpaymentforeach leased tract.The otherauction has a
cash-bonusbid,an annual rental,and a diminishingor slidingroyaltyrate
of not less than 121/2percentat the beginningof the lease period. The
schedule determines the applicable royaltyrate from the
royalty-rate
"adjusted" value ofproduction,withthe"adjustment"based on theGNP
fixed-weight
price index.40The applicable royaltyrate is thenapplied to
the actual value of productionto determinethe royaltypayment.
DOE issued finalregulationsfor the cash-bonus-bidauction that
provide for downstream-leasepaymentsbased on a fixedshare of net
profits,not less than thirtypercent,and an annual rental.41The profitshare rate is applied only after"capital recovery"by the lessee in the
amountof expenses incurredforspecifiedexplorationand development
activitiesplus a "reasonable" returnon the investmentrepresentedby
those expenses.42
B. AuthorizedRoyalty-Rate-Bid
Auctions
The 1978 Amendmentsauthorize threeroyalty-rate-bid
auctions.
They differfromeach otherin termsof the up-frontlease paymentsfor
whicha winningbidder is liable. The threealternativeup-frontpayment
termsare: (1) fixed-dollarworkcommitment;(2) fixed-cashbonus; and
DOE issued final
(3) fixed-cashbonus and fixed-dollarworkcommitment.
for
a
auction
a
with
fixed-cash
bonus and an
regulations
royalty-rate-bid
annual rental.43A winningbidderin thisauctionis responsibleforroyalty
paymentsbased on the constant royaltyrate specifiedin his (highest)
bid.
royalty-rate
C. AuthorizedProfit-Share-Bid
Auction
The 1978 Amendmentsauthorizeone profit-share-bid
auction.The
up-frontpaymenttermof thisauction is a fixed-cashbonus. DOE issued
finalregulationsfor an auction with a net-profit-share-bid
variable, a
fixed-cashbonus, and an annual rentalpaymentforeach tract.44In this
auction, a winningbidder is responsible for up-frontpaymentof the
fixed-cashbonus. The downstreampaymentsbased on the profit-share
bid are calculated thus. Before paymentof any net-profitshare to the
government,a lessee can recoverspecifiedexplorationand development
expenses, plus a "reasonable" returnon the investmentrepresentedby
those expenses. Followingthis"capital recovery,"the lessee is liable for
53
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paymentof a share of net profitsfromproductionand sales equal to the
highestprofitshare bid in the auction.45
D. AuthorizedDollar Work-Commitment-Bid
Auctions
The 1978 Amendmentsauthorizetwodollar-work-commitment-bid
auctions.Both auctionshave a fixedcash-bonus,up-front-payment
liabilityfora winningbidder. The auctionsdifferin the methodof calculating
downstreampaymentsin thatone has a fixed-royalty
rate and the other
has a diminishing-or sliding-royalty
rate,beginningat a rate of not less
than 12? percent. DOE issued finalregulationsfor an auction witha
dollar-work-commitment-bid
variable,a fixed-cashbonus, a fixed-royalty
rate, and an annual rental paymentfor each tract.46In thisauction, a
winningbidder is responsible for up-frontpaymentof the fixed-cash
bonus and fortheamountof his work-commitment
bid, to be paid either
in cash or as a performancebond. The winnercan satisfythedollar-work
commitmentand recoup the cash paymentor bond by conductingqualipercentof the allowable
fyingexplorationactivities.He may apply fifty
in
on
of
such
activities
satisfaction
the work-commitment
expenditures
bid.
E. Propertiesof the Cash-Bonus Bid, Fixed-Royalty-Rate
Auction
The cash-bonusbid, fixed-royalty-rate
auctionhas been used to sell
most OCS leases to date. Under the OCS Lands Act,47and under the
1978 Amendments,48the royaltyrate used in any particularlease sale
must be not less than 12? percent.Settingthe royaltyrate affectsboth
the timingof lease paymentsand theircumulativetotal. Ceterisparibus,
the
higher(lower) is the royaltyrate the lower (higher)is the bonus bid that
any bidder will make on a lease. Thus, in specifyingthe royaltyrate,the
Secretaryis determininga divisionof total lease paymentsbetweenupfrontbonus and downstreamcontingentpayments.But, the cumulative
total paymenton a lease also can varywiththe royaltyrate.The reason
forthisvariationis theroyaltyrate's explorationand developmentincentiveeffecton a winningbidder. In addition,since the royaltyrate affects
the division of lease paymentsbetween a certainfront-endbonus and
contingentroyaltypayments,it affectsthe allocation of the riskborne on
the leased tractbetween the private lease buyer and the public lease
seller.49In otherwords,since a higherroyaltyrate leads to a lowerlease
bonus, the higherrate causes a substitutionof riskycontingent-royalty
paymentsforcertainlease-bonus payments;hence, the higherrateshifts
riskfromthe lease buyer to the lease seller.
Clearly,by choosing a royaltyrate thatis considerablyhigherthan
the traditionalrates,thegovernmentcould substantiallyreduce theaverage size of winningbonus bids. Such a reductionwould make it possible
fora largernumberof qualifiedbidders to bear the riskof the up-front
bonus. But, high royaltyrates create undesirable incentivesforthe explorationand developmentof leased tracts.The reason forthese effects
is thatbeforeincome tax the lessee mustpay 100 percentof theexplora54
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tion and developmentcost, but he onlyreceivesthat 100 percentminus
the royaltypercentage rate of the oil produced. For example, if the
royaltyrate is 662/3percent,then to have an incentiveto incur the expense,a lessee would have to expecta presentdiscountedvalue of at least
$3 of oil productionto resultfroman additional $1 of explorationand
developmentexpense. By implication,veryhighroyaltyrateswould lead
to some otherwise promising tracts not being efficiently
developed.
Therefore,tryingto increasethenumberofcompetingbiddersbysetting
high royaltyrates in the traditionalauction would lead to less efficient
tractdevelopment and probably less production on OCS tracts.The
risk-allocationand exploration-developmentincentiveimplicationsof
the royaltyrate are thuscentralto an evaluationof the traditionalOCSlease auction and provide useful criteriafor comparingthe traditional
auction to the other auctions authorizedin the 1978 Amendments.
E ComparisonoftheNewlyAuthorizedBonus-BidAuctionswiththeFixedBonus-BidAuction
Royalty-Rate,
How do the newlyauthorizedbonus-bidauctionscompare withthe
traditionalauctionin termsof riskallocationand explorationand develauction. As set
opment incentives?First,consider the net-profit-share
out in theapplicable DOE regulations,a lessee would be allowed (capital)
recoveryofallocable explorationand developmentexpenses,plus a "reasonable" returnon those expenses, before beginningprofit-share
payments on the lease. The lion's share of explorationand development
even
expenses are thecostsof drillingand equippingwells.Furthermore,
the largestoil companies usuallycontractout drillingon OCS leases to
specialized companies. Hence, the capital-costdeduction in contemplalease should correspondcloselyto the
tionoflaw undera net-profit-share
actual economic (capital) costs of exploringand developingleases. But,
these investmentcosts, plus a "reasonable" returnon the costs, are
deductible from(production-sales)revenue before any net profit-share
paymentliabilityis incurred.Therefore,on leases acquired underthenet
auction,a (risk-neutral)lessee willhave an incentiveto make
profit-share
all explorationand developmentinvestmentexpendituresthatyieldexpected revenuewitha presentdiscountedvalue thatexceeds the investtermsof leases sold under
mentcost. Hence, the downstream-payment
the net profit-share
auction would not have the severe explorationand
developmentdisincentivesof the traditionalauction with high royalty
rates.
The net profit-share
variantof the bonus-bidauction thus appears
superiorto the traditionalauction forreducingbonus bids by increasing
expected downstreampaymentson leases. Settingrelativelyhigh profitsharingrates will lead to relativelylow winningbonus bids. This reduction in the magnitudeof bonus bids willincrease the numberof bidders
able to bear theriskof theup-frontbonus, bytransferring
partof therisk
to the governmentin the form of contingentprofit-sharepayments;
hence, the numberof bidders in the auction should expand.
55
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A furtherconsiderationin comparingthese two auctions concerns
enforcementand compliancecosts. To complywithDOE regulationson
leases sold underthenew auction,lessees mustadopt thenewaccounting
scheme.50In addition,the United States Geological Survey(hereinafter
accounts.
USGS) will be required to audit the new net-profit
variantof thebonus-bid
Next,considerthediminishingroyalty-rate
auction. A relativelyhigh royalty-rateschedule will substitutedownstreampaymentsforup-frontbonus paymentson a lease, and therefore
it should increase the numberof auction bidders. But, as withrelatively
high fixed royaltyrates (horizontal schedules), relativelyhigh sliding
schedules implya severe disincentivefor explorationand
royalty-rate
In decidingwhetherfurtherexplorationand develdevelopmentactivity.
a lessee will be concerned with the expected
is
worthwhile,
opment
of royaltypayments.If those paymentsare a
discounted
value
present
large proportionof theexpectedpresentdiscountedvalue oftheincrease
in productionthatwould resultfromthe increased investment,thenthe
to thisanalysiswhethinvestmentmaynot occur. It makeslittledifference
er a high average royaltyrate resultsfroma horizontalor a decreasing
rate schedule.
A decreasing royalty-rate
schedule can have an advantage forprolonging productionfromdepleted fieldswithhigh average production
costs. Aftera fullydeveloped lease has been in productionfor many
years, the natural drive of the reservoir,and thereforethe production
rate,declines. But, yearlyproductioncosts do not decrease as rapidlyas
does yearlyproduction. Indeed, yearlyproduction costs can increase.
Therefore,average productioncost increases. As soon as average productioncost exceeds theaveragevalue ofproductiontimesone minusthe
royaltyrate, it will no longer pay to continue productionon the lease.
and
Productioncan be prolongediftheroyaltyratedecreases sufficiently,
certainly,if it decreases to zero.51
G. Comparison of Royalty-BidAuctions withBonus-Bid Auctions
In a royalty-bidauction, USGS would set the up-frontpayment
termsof a lease, and the downstreampayments,other thanlease rental,
would depend on thewinningroyalty-rate
bid. First,considertheauction
in whichthe up-frontpaymentis a fixedcash bonus set by USGS. Ceteris
paribus,a high bonus will lead to low royaltybids and vice versa. But, if
high bonuses are a problem,it matterslittlewhethertheyare set by the
lessor or determinedby bid. Furthermore,if high royaltyrates lead to
in explorationand development,italso matterslittlewhether
inefficiency
the high royaltyrates are set by the lessor or determinedby bid. Thus,
the royalty-bid,
cash-bonus auction does not appear to promotethe objectives set out in the 1978 Amendments.
The variantof the royalty-bid
auction witha fixed-dollarworkcommitmenthas somewhatdifferent
propertiesthan the cash-bonusvariant
of this auction. To date, the DOE has not issued regulationsfor this
56
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thena fixed-dollarwork
auction.But,ifsuch regulationsare forthcoming,
willsharemanyof thefeaturesof thework-commitment-bid
commitment
auction. Specifically,assume that a lessee could recoup a fixed-dollar
work-commitment
credit
paymentor performancebond bya fifty-percent
on allowable explorationexpenses, as in the work-commitment-bid
aucto
tion. This credit would provide a fifty-percent
incremental
subsidy
explorationexpendituresas long as the workcommitmenthad not been
met. This incentivewould interactwiththe incentivefor under-investmentin explorationand developmentinherentin a positiveroyaltyrate.
But, the USGS would not have the necessaryinformationto allow it to
fine-tunethese offsettingincentiveeffectsfor exploration, to achieve
in exploration.The worklease-paymenttermsthatpromote efficiency
commitmentvariantof theroyalty-bid
auctionwould thusappear to have
less severe explorationdisincentiveeffectsthan would the cash-bonus
variant. But, the cash-bonus-bid,net-profit-share
auction appears to
dominateboth of these auctions in promotingefficiency
in exploration
and development.
H. Comparisonof theProfit-Share-Bid
Auction,
withBonus-BidAuctions
The profit-share-bid,
fixed-cash-bonusauction can have the same
auction just disadvantage as the cash-bonus-bid, fixed-profit-share
cussed: a relativelylow up-frontbonus can be combined withrelatively
high downstreampayments,withoutsevere exploration and developmentdisincentives.Therefore,the precedingcomparisonsof the bonusauction to other auctions can apply to the profitbid, net-profit-share
share-bidauction. There is one possible problem withthe profit-share
bid, fixed-bonusauction thatis not sharedby the bonus-bid,fixed-profitshare auction. That is the possible incentivefor prematurelease abandonmentby capacity-constrained
firmsfacingveryhigh,bid-determined
rates.USGS can guard againstthisoutcome by not setting
profit-sharing
verylow fixedbonuses.
I. Comparisonof Dollar-Work-Commitment-Bid,
AuctionswithBonus-BidAuctions
The dollar-work-commitment-bid
auction has some interrelated,
unusual propertiesforboth lease-value determinationand forefficiency
in exploration.The efficiency
implicationsfollowfromthe fifty-percent
creditfor qualifyingexploration expenses towardrecouping the workcommitmentcash paymentor performancebond. As long as the workcommitmentbid has not been fulfilled,the fifty-percent
creditprovides
an incentive,a subsidy,foroverinvestment
in qualifyingexplorationactivities.This incentiveinteractswiththeincentiveforunderinvestment
in
explorationand developmentinherentin a positiveroyaltyrate.The net
effectof these provisionsis a disincentiveto developmentand an incentive forexplorationof generallyindeterminatedirectionand size.
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The lease-valuationpropertiesof thisauction are confusedwithits
implicitsubsidyto exploration.If thefixedbonus, royaltyrate,and rental
termsof a lease are sufficiently
low, then a bidder has an incentiveto
bid as if it were a partiallyrebatable
calculate his work-commitment
bonus bid. In that case this auction, in effect,becomes a bonus-bid,
auction withan implicitsubsidyto exploration.Alterfixed-royalty-rate
natively,ifthe lease's fixedtermsare sufficiently
high,thena bidderhas
of his expected subsidized exan incentivesimplyto bid fifty-percent
penditureon qualifyingexplorationactivities.In thatcase, thisauction
value for the lease.
does not provide a market-determined
The precedingdiscussionreveals thatelementaryeconomic theory
can providesome insightsinto the propertiesof theauthorizedauctions.
But, we cannot resolve in thiswaysome of the questions thatthelegislation posed. In particular,the concernwiththe relativerevenue-generating propertiesof the auctions presentssome challengingquestions for
theoreticaland empiricalresearch.
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF AUCTIONS
We have loosely referredto the congressional directivefor using
nontraditionalauctions as an "experiment."This terminologyalso appears in the Court's decision.52In its broadest sense, the term"experiment" could mean "investigation,"encompassing both theoreticaland
empiricalanalysis.
The previous section demonstratesthat economic theorycan answersome of thequestions implicitin thelegislationand itscongressional history.But, theoreticalanalysisin the absence of empiricaltestingis
of limitedand questionable value. As Section II suggests,some of the
questions thatCongress is askingare in advance of the currentstate of
theoreticalknowledge. Some of the results are qualitative,and if an
auction displaysmutuallycountervailingqualitativeincentives,then the
net theoreticalpredictioncan be ambiguous. And,just because a wellformedtheoryexists does not implythatthe theoryhas passed the test
of yieldingvalid predictions.
Theoretical and fieldor laboratoryexperimentalanalysesare complementary.The judicious use of theorycan guide the experimenterin
thatone
discerningwhichare themostimportanttests.By demonstrating
or more of the auction mechanisms creates undesirable incentives,
theoreticalanalysiscan winnowout the promisingauction mechanisms
forfurther
empiricaltests.53Resultsof empiricalstudiesalso mayprovide
for
insights
extending the state of theoreticalknowledge. In this way,
interact.
theoryand experimentsynergistically
Likewise,fieldand laboratoryobservationscan complementeach
other and economic theory." Nevertheless,there are importantmethodological differencesbetween these two empirical approaches. We
argue here that the field-experiment
approach that the 1978 Amend58
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mentsimplicitlyendorsed harbors manymethodologicalshortcomings.
We thenexaminetherelativelynew techniqueoflaboratoryexperiments,
whichis potentiallysuperior to field tests in answeringquestions that
Congress asked in the 1978 Amendments.
A. The Congressional Directiveas a Field Experiment
In the 1978 Amendments,Congress directedthatthenontraditional auctions account for at least twentypercentof the total number of
auctions.55The Amendmentsalso includeextensiverequirementsforthe
Secretaryto reportto Congress on the resultsof the variousauctions.56
These requirementsadd up to asking the Secretaryto conduct a field
experiment.
In the argot of experimentation,the primary"treatmentvariable"
in the experimentis the legal-institutional
environment,definedby the
auction rules and the lease's downstreamfeatures.But, thereare other
variablesless under the Secretary'scontrolthatcould affectthe bidding
firms'decisions. Some of these variables relate to the geological and
economic environment,for example, to the geological structureunder
the tracts,the implicationsof seismic or other surveys,the presentand
expected futureprices of oil and gas, and so forth.We use the phrase
thiscategoryof variables.Anothercate"geonomic variables" to identify
goryincludesthose variablesthatrelateto themotivationaland decisionmaking attributesof the specific firmsin the bidding. We call these
"bidder-specific"variables.
A primaryrequirementfora valid experimentis thatthe geonomic
and bidder-specificvariablesremainconstantwhile the institutionis altered. In field experiments,in which complete control usually is not
possible,thatcontrolcould be approximatedifthe geonomicand bidderspecificvariables were randomized and unbiased in their occurrence
auction institutions.
among the different
Perhaps because of the guidance of the received theory,we might
also believe thatthe auctions' relativeperformanceswill depend on the
realized values of the geonomic variables,as the auction institutionis
realizationsof the
perturbed.If thispropositionrequirestestsat different
geonomic variables,at least one of two conditionsmusthold: first,the
geonomic variables must be experimentercontrolledand alterable; or
second, thegeonomicvariablesare notexperimentercontrolled,but they
mustoccur at the "appropriate" values randomlyand unbiasedlyacross
the other treatments.Of course, in eithercase the experimentershould
knowthe patternof the geonomic variables,to associate theirrealization
withthe performanceof the auctions. Finally,aftercollectingall of the
relevantdata under all of the appropriateexperimentalconditions,the
experimentercan compare the various institutionswithreferenceto the
exogenouslydeterminedpolicy objectives.
Compare this idealized field-experimentprocess with the attributesof the OCS field"experiment."
First,thereis littleabilityto control
59
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geonomic and bidder-specificconditions as the auction mechanismis
varied.The onlywaythatthegovernmentcan perturbtheauctioninstituOCS tracts.To begin to meet the conditions
tion is across the different
ofunbiased randomnessand to allow forappropriatestatisticalinference,
the Secretarycould takea blockof perhaps severalhundredtracts,assign
auction methods,and thenconduct
themrandomlyamong the different
all of theauctionssimultaneously.Aside fromthepossible contamination
of the experimentfromtract-valueinterdependencies,thereis the problem of bidder self-selectionbiases across the differentauction institutions.57
Second,the governmentalso has verylittleabilityto alter the geonomic variables to values thatcreate the most powerfulor criticaltests.
Even if the geonomic variables thatprevailappear randomlyacross the
treatments,some key realizationssimplymightnot be observed in the
field.
associatedwithany OCS
Third,thereis a vastamountof uncertainty
auction. Not onlyare manyof the geonomicvariablesusuallyunknown,
.but also the governmentprobablyknowslittleabout variationsin bidder
expectationsregardingthese variables.Similarly,the governmentmight
knowlittleabout variationsin the bidder-specific
variablesacross auction
participants.
Fourth,to the extentthatCongressdesires an ex postevaluationof
its objectives,the appropriate data could take decades to collect. For
aucpropertiesof different
example, to compare the revenue-generating
tionsusing fielddata, the experimenterwould have to waituntildata on
downstreamlease paymentswere available.
Finally,forthe experimentto be valid, everyexperimentalsample
requiresa bindingcommitmentto lease an OCS tractundertheproposed
rules. The fieldexperimentmay demonstratethatone of the approved
auction processes results in disastrousagreements,but only at the expense of obligatingthe governmentto preciselysuch agreementson one
or several OCS tracts.The Secretarymightexercise statutorydiscretion
to refuseto issue tractsfrommechanismsdiscoveredto be unsatisfactory
and to reruntheauctionwitha different
mechanism.But, thewidespread
in
ex
that
this
rules might occur would alter
expectation
postchange
bidderdecisions in thefirstauction,renderingtheresultingobservations
misleadingor useless.
Hence, although the governmentcollects a large amount of data
fromOCS auctions,what it can learn in the scientificsense fromthese
observationsis severelylimited.Given some of the attributesof OCS
auctions,we can easilyillustratethe potentialpitfallsof fieldexperimentation.Suppose that,froma large body of fielddata fromOCS auctions,
one wantedto compare auctionsA and B. For thecomparisonto be valid,
processes A and B should each have been testedunbiasedlyacross all of
the relevantcombinationsof geonomic variables. But, if auction A was
used exclusivelyin 1979-1980, while process B was testedexclusivelyin
60
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1983, then a valid comparison seems impossible,because of the great
differencein oil-marketconditionsin the two periods. Or, suppose that
both were offeredtogetherin a relativelycomparable timeframe.Then,
theexpectationsabout underlyinggeological characteristics
should have
been randomlyand unbiasedly distributedbetween the tractsoffered
under auctionsA and B. And, ifthe two kindsof auction processes were
indeed tested in the same time period, this simultaneitycreates a real
possibilityof self-selectionbias in the observations.Althoughnone of
these potentialshortcomingsnecessarilymustmaterialize,we use them
to emphasize the problems of interpretingOCS fielddata.
B. An AlternativeExperimentalTechnique
The governmentmightconsidertheuse oflaboratory-experimental
methodsas a supplementto fieldexperimentation.This technique has
alreadyfounduse in manyareas of economic researchin general,and in
the studyof auction markets,in particular.We will not repeat here in
detail thehistoryof thistechnique's methodologicalgrounding.Instead,
we referthe reader to other workon this subject,58and we list briefly
some of thepotentialadvantagesof the laboratorytechnique.Section IV
examinessome of the existingexperimentalresultson the performance
of auction marketsand discusses how theyrelate to the questions raised
Action.
by the 1978 Amendmentsand by Energy
The firstand principaladvantage of laboratoryexperimentationis
in thecontrolprovidedover thetest'sparameters.Perturbingthebidding
rules and institutionsis straightforward,
and it can be accomplishedin a
relativelyshorttime.The experimenteralso has knowledgeof and controlover theexperiment'sfeaturesthatare homologous to thegeonomic
conditionsofan OCS auction.As an example,we could designan experimentso thatthebiddersare uncertainof theauctionedobject's value and
yet the experimentercan know and alter the informationon whichbidders base theirestimateof thatvalue. We can also alter the noninstitutionalvariables,such as individualvalues fortheauctioneditems,so that
we can compare the bidding institutionsat several referencepoints.59
A secondadvantage
of laboratoryexperimentsis thatwe can conduct
informative
testsof the different
bidding institutionswithvalues of the
geonomic conditionsthathave neverbeen observed in the field.We can
create these conditionsin the laboratory.
A thirdadvantage of laboratoryexperimentationis that the direct
resourcecost is low, as is theopportunitycost of discoveringthe malperformanceof one of theauction mechanisms.One of the processes might
fail,but we have wasted no OCS tractsto findthatout.
Finally,replicationunder controlled conditions is easy, and data
collectionis relativelyquick. Both fieldand laboratoryexperimentshave
thelimitationthatbidder-specific
attributes,such as riskpreferencesand
adaptationabilities,are relativelyunobservable.But, thelaboratorytechnique enjoys at least three advantages concerningthis problem. First,
61
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replicationto sense therobustnessof theresultsto individualidiosyncracies is easier in thelaboratorythanin thefield.Second, we can moretruly
randomize individualbidders among institutionsin the laboratory,with
a lowerprobabilityof self-selectionbiases. Third, in thelaboratorythere
are some partialwaysto controlor testfortheinfluenceofbidder-specific
attributes,such as riskaversion,even ifthoseattributesare unobservable.
Laboratoryexperimentssurelycannot answer all of the questions
thatone mightask. But, any interpretationof eitherfieldor laboratory
data in termsof an underlyinghypothesisabout bidder decision making
requires certaincontrolconditions.Laboratoryexperimentscan testalternativemodels withcontrolconditionsnot realizable in thefield.From
theresultsof laboratorytests,one is in a betterpositionto rejectinappropriate models and to select the more promisingmodel or models of
or
bidder decision makingforfurtheruse in assessing policyalternatives,
in designing betterfieldexperimentsforauctioningOCS leases. Time
requirementsare relativelybrief,and laboratoryexperiments,again, require no commitmentof OCS tractsas a part of the tests.
We would not pretendto anticipatethe outcome of a comprehensive laboratoryexperimentaltest of any or all of the alternativeOCS
auctions. Each contains featuresthathave not yetbeen incorporatedin
laboratoryexperimentalwork. Nevertheless,there has been extensive
experimentalresearch into other similarkinds of auction mechanisms.
Section IV describes the nature of this research. When appropriateit
reportswhattheexistingauctionexperimentstellus about whatwe know,
and about whatwe can potentiallylearn in thelaboratory,concerningthe
various kinds of OCS auctions.
IV. THE STANDARD AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PERFORMANCE
Historically,a great varietyof auction institutionshas evolved for
the sale of a single object, such as an antique or a painting,or multiple
units of identicalitems,such as U.S. Treasury Bills or gold bars. When
thereare multipleunitsof nonidenticalitems,it is customaryto auction
individualitemsin some sequence, as in livestockauctions,or in assembled lots,as in the Netherlands'produce and flowerauctions.The OCS
auctions differfromall of these examples in that individualtractsin a
givenauctionare not identical,althoughtheymaybe close substitutesor
complements,and separate simultaneousbids mustbe tenderedforeach
tractthateach bidder desires.
While thistechnicaldifferencebetweenOCS and standardauctions
is a featureof consequence, thereare several reasons whyan analysisof
some of the standardauction systemsis of directinterestand relevance
to OCS leasing. First,the standardauctions illustratesome of the rich
varietyof differentinstitutionalprocedures available for use in OCS
leasing,whetherthe bids are in cash, as a royaltypercentage,or in other
forms.Second, theoreticalanalysisof these different
auction institutions
62

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Tue, 12 Jan 2016 16:22:19 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Volume2, 1983

suggests that the price and efficiencyof an award reflectthe kind of
auction used. Third, experimentalevidence demonstratesthatthe kind
of auctionused affectsboth priceand efficiency.
Fourth,whenthe results
differamong the differentstandard auctions, it is because the auction
rules affectbidding incentives.We expect these incentivedifferencesto
apply withequal force to OCS leasing.
the
Here, we providea briefoverviewof those auction institutions,
"standard" auctions,forwhichtheoriesof biddinghave been articulated,
and thathave been subjectedto a rigorousexperimentalexamination.To
date, therehas been no experimentalexaminationof auctioninstitutions,
thathave thedistinguishing
or of thetheoryof such institutions,
propertiesof OCS tracts,namely,simultaneousbiddingon multiplenonidentical items, and item valuation based on the acquisition of costly
In view of the growinguse of experimentalmethodsin the
information.
of
study pricinginstitutions,futureresearch is likelyto address these
propertiesof OCS tracts.
A. Definitionsof the Standard Auctions
Althoughthe literaturedistinguishesa great number of different
auctions,thereare onlyfourprimarykinds:The Englishand Dutch"oral"
sealed-bid auctions.60
auctions,and thefirst-and second-price,
These are themostcommonlyknownauctionsin the
Englishauctions.
UnitedStates.The process begins withtheauctioneersolicitingan initial
bid fromthe crowd of potentialbuyers,forsome object thatis offered
for sale. Any announced bid, when recognized by the auctioneer,
becomes the standingbid. Anynew bid is admissibleonly ifit is higher
than the standingbid. The sequence of ascending bids, each displacing
itspredecessor,ends whentheauctioneercannotsolicita newhigherbid,
and the item is declared sold to the last bidder at a price equal to the
amount that he bids. Bidders can easily preserve their anonymityby
agreeingto a privatesignalingsystemwiththe auctioneer.In some auctions,the auctioneeractivelysolicitsbids, whilein othersthe auctioneer
merelyrecognizes bids thatare freelyannounced fromthe floor. Most
public auctions of art, antiques, equipment, livestock,and household
goods in the United States and Great Britainuse the Englishmethod.It
is probablytheoldest auctionsystem.Thus, Cassady notes thataccording
to Herodotus theBabyloniansauctioned marriageablewomenas earlyas
500 B.C., and themethodofauctionappears to have followedtheascending-bidprocedure.61Roman auctions probablyused the ascending-bid
procedure, since the word auction derives fromthe latin root auctus,
meaning "an increase."62
Dutchauctions.
In the Dutch-auctionprocedure,the price begins at
a level considered to be higherthanany buyeris willingto pay, and the
auctioneerdecreases itorallyuntilthefirstbuyersignalsacceptance.The
itemis awarded to thisbuyerat the price standingat the timeof acceptance. Produce and cut flowersare sold in the Netherlandsby thisproce63
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dure, and an electric clock whose hands rotate counterclockwiseautomaticallydisplaysthe descending prices. The buyerwishingto accept
thestanding-offer
pricedepresses a buttonthatstops theclock.Although
this procedure is less familiarin the United States than is the English
auction, it is oftenencounteredhere in some form.In Boston, Filene's
Basementis famousformarkingdown all clothingon a regularschedule.
The schedule rules are displayedand well knownto shoppers. The airlines have used a variantof the Dutch procedure when a flightis overbooked, to induce volunteersto relinquishseat claims. In thiscase, there
is a single buyerand manypotentialsellers. Hence, the "Dutch price,"
representinga bid to buy rather than an offerto sell, must ascend.
Althoughthe exact procedure probablyvaries,one approach is to raise
the bid until enough passengers accept to clear the flightof all overbooked seats,withall such passengersreceivingthesame compensation.
In multiple-unitDutch auctions, buyers need not pay a common
price. Thus, according to Cassady, "[o]rdinarily,the firstbid is the only
bid, althoughit is conceivable,if the amount takenis optional,thatthe
balance of a lot would be sold by continuingthe price downward."63In
thecase of heterogeneousitems,such as thecomponenttractsofan OCS
auctionblock,one could use theDutch auction,allowingthefirstsuccessfulbidder the option of selectingthe tractdesired at the firstacceptance
price. The offerprice then could continue its descent until a second
acceptance,withthesecond bidder selectingthe tractdesired,and so on,
untilall tractsare sold.
This is thewell-knownand widelyused procedure
auctions.
First-price
in whicheach bidder submitsa writtenbid. All bids are opened at once,
and thehighestbidder is awarded theitemat a price equal to theamount
bid. Thus, thefirst,or highestbid determinestheprice. As noted earlier,
thisis the institutionused in OCS bidding. In the OCS auctions,all of
thebids and bidderson each tractare publicized,notjust thewinningbid.
Practices vary concerning the post-auctionannouncementof bids. In
some sealed-bidauctionsonlythewinningbid is announced,and in some
onlythewinningand second highestbids are made public. In theprimary
auction of U.S. Treasury bills, a multiple-unit,sealed-bid auction,only
the highestand lowest accepted bids are announced, but the identityof
the bidders is not made public.
auctions.
These auctionsproceed as under thefirst-price
Second-price
rules, except thatthe highestbidder wins and pays a price equal to the
second-highestbid submitted.This procedure is rarelyused in practice,
but it has been of considerable interestin the economics literatureon
auctions,because of its incentiveproperties.64The second-priceauction
was firstdefinedand analyzedbyVickrey,65
and itis sometimescalled the
"Vickreyauction." In the London stamp auction, and also in some primaryfishmarketsthatuse oral Englishauctions,buyersnot presentare
allowed to submitbook bids.
In book bidding,the award is made at one level, or price interval,
64
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above the floor bid or the second-highestbook bid, whicheveris
larger. ... If he [the auctioneer] gets no bid fromthe floor,the
goods are knockeddown to the highestbook bidder at a pricejust
above the offerof the second-highestbidder.66
This is exactlythe procedure thatVickreycalls the "second-price"
method,except forthe modificationof the use of a standard-bidadvance
auction "utilized in cerinterval.67
Cassady also describes a written-bid
tainmarketsituations,permittingeach bidder to submittwo bids rather
than one. His higherbid goes into effectonly ifhis lower bid does not
exceed thebids of competitors,but theaward is made on thebasis of the
lower figureif it is higherthan the highestbid of competitors."68This
scheme mayinclude the second-priceauction,and it maybe quite old.69
B. Auction-Market
Theory
The fourbasic auctionsjust definedhave distinctinformationand
incentiveproperties,and as a consequence, they may yield different
prices or allocations. The example illustratedin Figure 1 facilitatesour
discussionof the theoryof these auctions.There, we suppose thatthere
are N;2 buyerswillingto bid fora single,indivisibleitemthatthe seller
offersat any positiveprice determinedin the auction; thatis, the seller
specifiesno reservationprice.
Our analysishere adopts fourprimaryassumptions.First,each buyer i associates a known(to thatbuyer)cash value, v,,withthe item,such
thatv,is definedas the maximumamount thati would be willingto pay
for the item ratherthan lose it to another buyer. Second,if i and j are
distinctpersons, then the value, v,,to any i is independentof the value,
vp,to anyj, in the sense that v,would not change if i had knowledgeof
vj, and vice versa, for any i and j. In particular,this means that each
person's maximumwillingnessto pay has no informationvalue for any
otherperson. Third,
each ihas completeknowledgeonlyofhis own value,
and not that of others. And, fourth,the cost of transacting-thinking,
deciding,and bidding-is negligiblefor each person.
We note that the second assumptiondoes not preventindividual
valuationsfrombeing correlatedor associated in otherways.For example, all values cah be "high" or "low" forsome object relativeto another
object, yet remain independent in the sense of this assumption. The
second assumptionhas importantconsequences forthe analysisof auctions,and later we discuss the effectof relaxingit.70This assumptionis
importantfor applications to OCS leasing, because differencesin individualvalues mayreflectdifferencesin information,
and thereforevalues maynotbe independentifsome bidderswould be unwillingto ignore
differences.71
theseinformation
By itself,thefirstassumptionis relatively
innocuous forthe analysisof auctions.If the value of an itemto a bidder
is uncihrtain,
thenwe need only suppose thatthe uncertainprospecthas
an equivalentcash-certainvalue, reflectingthe degree to whichthatperson discountsforuncertainty
because of riskaversion.The thirdassump65
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tion is importantand necessary,because all valuations are inherently
privateand subjective.Furthermore,people are not normallywell-motivated to reveal credible informationabout theirown valuationsto other
marketparticipants.
For convenienceof exposition,Figure 1 numbersthebuyers,so that
v, > v2 > ... > v,, > v,, and it also rules out tied values. We say that
an auction is efficient
(Pareto optimal)in allocation ifit awardsthe itemto
the person who values it most highly(buyer 1, in Figure 1). As Section
I explains, the essence of this definitionis that an efficientallocation
exhausts the gains fromexchange.72If the itemis awarded to any buyer
except 1,say,to 3, thenthatbuyercan reselltheitemto 1 at a price(above
v, but below v,) thatyields a monetarygain to both persons. Observe
is an attributeof an auction quite disthat,by thisdefinition,efficiency
tinctfromthepriceresultingfroman auction.One auctionmethodmight
yield a higher proportion of efficientallocations than a second, even
thoughprices achieved using the second auction are higherthan those
achieved withthe first.This is because efficiency
depends on the buyer
withvalue v, biddinghigh relativeto the bids of otherbuyers,whilethe
auctionpricedepends on theabsolute level of thehighestbid. Obviously,
Figure 1.
Illustrationof buyer valuations ftorsingle object.
valuation
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while all bids could
all bids mightbe quite low, but the award efficient,
be high,but the award inefficient.
Consequently,a high price does not
necessarilyimplyan efficientaward, and the two attributes,price and
efficiency,may be in conflict.73Later, we provide experimentaldata
demonstratingthat this possibilityis more than a mere abstractcuriosity.74But, fromFigure 1 it is clearlypossible forprice to be such that
the auction mustbe efficient;
any price between v, and v,,by the definiallocation.
tion of vi,must yield an efficient
Since, in any given market,the vi are not observable, the only
evidence that may suggest inefficiency
is the occurrence of an aftermarketexchange.75If we observe two participantsin a given auction
marketengaging in an after-market
trade,and ifthe second assumption
is correct,thenthe auction could not have been efficient.
By contrast,in
the OCS auction,in whichvalues maydifferbecause biddershave different information,
and in whichmultiplenonidenticaltractsare auctioned,
after-market
exchange mayoccur,because biddersreassess values based
on informationthat the bids have revealed. Or, perhapsjust as likely,
bidders may want to acquire tractsin certain combinations,and they
failedto do so in theprimaryauction.76The publicityof pricesat auctions
all but guarantees that an inefficient
award will be reallocated to the
in
a
bidder
subsequent private exchange. The highesthighest-value
value bidder,observingthattheawardwas at a pricebelow hiswillingness
to pay, has an incentiveto approach the winningbidder witha higher
bid.77
In Englishauctions,ifat any timethe standingbid,
Englishauctions.
bj,is below the value to buyeri, then i has an incentiveto raise the bid
by some amount no greaterthan v, - bj.In auctions witha standardbid
increment,
d, buyeri would be preparedto bid b;= b+ d. This processof
the
raising
standingbid will continue untilbuyers 1 and 2 are the only
activebidders. (See Figure 1). If thepenultimatebidder,buyer2, bids b,
=
v2- d, thenbuyer1 willbe the finalwinningbidderwitha bid of bl= v2,
but if buyer2's penultimatebid is b2=2, then buyerI wins witha bid
bl= v2+ d. Hence, thetheoreticalEnglish-auction
priceis p,= v2,or slightly
on
unstructured
the
auction's
above, depending
bidding dynamicsand
the size of the standard (or freelychosen, final) bid increment.Since
These resultsall
buyer1 is the winningbidder,the allocationis efficient.
follow,because the English auction is a demand-revealingmechanism.
The process is capable of enticingany buyerto bid value, if necessary.
Only thehighest-valuebuyerfindsthisfull-valuebid not to be necessary.
The first-price,
sealed-bid auction uses the same
auctions.
First-price
allocationand price-determination
rule as the Englishauction-the high
bidder winsand pays whathe bids-but the analysisand predictedoutcomes are completelydifferent.
This resultoccurs because of the different bid-informationconditions in the two kinds of auctions. In the
auction,each bidder selects a singlebid withoutbenefitof any
first-price
67
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public bid information.Therefore,the amount that i bids can depend
only on v, and on i's assessmentof the otherbidders' actions. If i bids
bi= vi,thismaximizesthe chance thati willwin,but it guaranteesa zero
surplus (vi-bi=O0) if the bid wins. Hence, if i believesthat a bid in the
amount of v has some chance of winning,then thereexistsan inherent
in whichbiddingslightlyless than v,yieldsa gain in surplus to
trade-off,
be weighed against the reduced chance of winning.Any bidder i, who
eitheris not extremelyriskaverse or has no special reason to believe that
others will bid more, will hedge and bid less than vi. Hence, we can
sealedpredictthateach i willbid less than v;.This is whythe first-price,
bid auction is not a demand-revealingmechanism.
We can also predictthatbecause bidders are likelyto varyin their
expectationsabout others'biddingactionsand willvaryin termsof their
attitudestowardrisk,theyare also likelyto varyin the extentto which
theyunder-revealdemand by bidding less than value. These conditions
increase the likelihood thatthe winningbidder will not be the highestvalue buyer.78In Figure 1, if buyer 1 is not averse to risk-taking,
and if
he expects othersto bid low (because of depressed economic conditions
or forotherreasons), then his bid may be much below v,. By contrast,
ifbuyer2 is veryriskaverse or not optimisticthatotherswillbid low, then
he maybid veryclose to his value. Under such conditions,theitemcould
be awarded to buyer2. Hence, by comparisonwiththe English auction,
it seems less likelythat the first-price
auction will be efficient.
Withoutadding additional structureto the analysis,we can conauction. If
clude nothingabout whatprice to expect fromthe first-price
the N values, vi, are regarded as independentoccurrences fromsome
intervalbetweenzero and -0,withall values in thisintervalbeing equally
of completeignorance),and ifall
likely(in a sense thisis a characterization
buyersare risk-neutral,
expected-surplusmaximizers,then we can show
that a non-cooperativeequilibrium-bidfunctionfor all i is given by
bI=(N-1)vilN.7TM That is, the ratio of one's optimal bid to one's
known value is just the proportion of the bids that will be rejected.
We can also show thatunder certainassumptionsabout the risk-averse
characteristics
of thepopulationof bidders,we can derivean equilibrium
bid/valueratioforeach i, whichlies above theVickreyrisk-neutral
ratio,
(N- 1)/N.80Under Vickrey'sassumptions, the expected prices in the
and Englishauctionsare the same and are equal to the expectfirst-price
ed second highestvalue: thatis,E(p1)= E() = E(v2)= -(N - 1)(N + 1). But,
the modifiedmodel withriskaversionyields a higherexpected price in
the first-price
auction;thatis,E(pi)>E(p,)
Dutchauctions.Vickreywas the firstto argue thatthe Dutch-auction
institutioncalls forthe same kindof strategicconsiderationsas does the
auction. Each bidder must decide at what price to stop the
first-price
clock,withno informationfromthe auction itselfabout whatcompeting
bidders are prepared to bid. If the clock stops, then one learns whata
competitorhas bid, but then the auction is over. It is truethatwhilethe
68
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clockis stillrunning,each bidderlearnsthatat theprevioushigherprices,
no bidderwas willingto accept. But, thisinformation
is not veryinformative,because whateach bidder needs to know is at what lowerprice the
most eager buyeris willingto accept. Some have argued thatthe Dutch
price will not be verymuch below the highest value, v,, in Figure 1,
because each bidderwillbe motivatedto accept theofferas soon as itgets
just below his value, to avoid losing to anotherbidder.81This argument
ignores the gain in surplus at a lower price, which must be weighed
against the "cost" of an increased risk of losing the item to another
bidder.82Formal analysis of the Dutch auction suggests thatit will be
to the first-price
auction,
equivalent (yieldthe same price and efficiency)
and this equivalence holds under various alterations in the assumptions.83
auctions.Vickreyintroduced this auction procedure in
Second-price
answer to the rhetoricalquestion: Is there"some sealed-bid procedure
thatwould be logicallyisomorphic"to the English auction?84This auction has incentivesverydifferentfromthose of the first-price
auction,
because each bidder knows that,if he is the highestbidder, except for
ties, then the price paid will be independentof the amount bid. Hence,
the higher i's bid, the greater is the chance that he will win, withno
correspondingreductionin surplus,because surplus to i is - b,,if i is
v; an incenthe highestbidder and j, the second-highestbidder. Each ihas
tiveto bid his value, vi,as a means of maximizingthe chance of winning,
regardlessof his attitudetowardrisk.85It would not be optimalfor i to
bid more thanvi,because ifi winsand thenexthighestbid is greaterthan
then a loss is incurred.Thus, in Figure 1 each i has an incentiveto
v;,
bid bi= vi. If all biddersdo this,thenbuyer1 is awarded the itemat price
p2=2, the theoreticalprice in the second-priceauction. By thisreasonand essentiallythe
ing thesecond-priceauctionyieldsthesame efficiency,
same price,as the English auction.
In thetheoryof
auctions.
theoretical
Comparative
ofthestandard
properties
Englishand second-priceauctions,the outcomes are competitive,in the
sense thatthe allocations are efficient,
and everyaward is at the price v,
in Figure 1, whichis the lowestprice thatequates supply(one unit) with
demand. These theoreticalresultshold forany numberof biddersN;2,
and theyare independentof individualattitudestowardrisk. Provided
only thatmore surplus is betterforeach bidder, in the English auction
bids must continue to increase until v, is reached, and in the secondprice,sealed-bid auction it is a dominantstrategyforeach bidder to bid
his value, whichyieldsthe price v,. If we add Vickrey'sassumption,that
the vi are drawn fromthe uniformdistributiondefinedon the interval
from zero to f, then the expected value of price in the English and
second-priceauctionsis the expected value of the second highestamong
a sample of N values; thatis E(pe)= E(p2)= E(V2)= f(N- 1)I(N + 1). Thus,
the expected price to the seller approaches the maximumpossible value,
?i,as N is increased.This resultdoes not mean thatthe marketbecomes
"more competitive"withlarge N. It means merelythatthe chances grow
69
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largerthatthe second highestvalue willbe near f. In thisnon-cooperativetheory,the marketisjust as competitive,in the sense thatawards are
efficient
and at a market-clearing
price,whetherN= 2 or N= 100.
In the Dutch and first-price
auctions,we can articulateno specific
of
and
allocation
without
theory price
introducingassumptionsabout the
distributionof values and the bidders'attitudestowardrisk.If we apply
Vickrey'sassumption,thentheoutcomesin thesetwoauctionswillbe comBut,sincetheawards
petitivein thesense thattheallocationsare efficient.
are at thepricevI(N-I)/N,theyneed notbe at a pricethatequatessupplyand
demand. The expected value of this price is
E(vi)(N-I)/N=E(v2)=
and theawardsare competitive
in thesensethaton
f(N - 1)/(N+ 1), however,
the
is
the
lowest
that
clears
the
market.
average
price
price
Consequently,
outcomesin the Dutch and first-price
auctionsare competitivein a much
weaker sense than are the correspondingoutcomesin the English and
second-priceauctions.To illustratethispropositionsuppose thatthereare
two bidders,withv = J10and v2= 6. Under the Vickreyassumptionseach
bidder knowshis own value and knowsthathe can regardbothvalues as
Ifeach personbidstomaximizeexpected
drawnfroma uniformdistribution.
surplus,on the assumptionthat the other person will do likewise,then
bidder I bids b, = v(N - 1)/(N)= 5, while bidder 2 bids b2= v2(N -* I)(N) = 3.

The award goes to bidder1 at price5 in a Dutchor first-price
auction,and
thisprice is below the lowestmarket-clearing
price,whichis 6. But, in an
Englishor second-priceauction,theawardgoes to bidderI at price6. If the
values were v, = 14 and v2= 6, thenthe Dutchor first-price
auctionaward
would be at price 7, whichis higherthanthe price (6) in the Englishand
outcomesoccur,becausetheprobabilsecond-priceauction.These differing
of pricesis differentin the Dutch and first-price
auctions
itydistribution
than it is in the English and second-priceauctions. But, since the two
distributions
happen to have thesame expectedvalue,we can expectprices
on average to be the same in the twosetsof institutions.
In the Dutch and
auctions,thelargerisN, thecloseriseach person'sbid tohisvalue,
first-price
and, as in the English and second-priceauctions, the expected price
approachesf.
If we replace Vickrey'sassumption,that bidders are riskneutral,
withthe assumptionthattheyshow different
degrees of riskaversion,86
then the allocations are no longer necessarilyefficientand expected
prices are increased in the Dutch and first-priceauctions; that is,
E(pd) = E(p/i)>lD(N - I)/(N + 1) = E((pr)= E(P2).

values.Suppose that individualbuyers'
Efectofpositively
dependent
values are not independent,because forat least some persons,theitem's
value would increase upon learningthatothersvalue it more highlythan
theydo. For example, an oil companymightvalue an OCS tractat $100
million,but revalueitupwardon learningthatone or more othercompanies assess its value in excess of $100 million. This revaluationcould
occur withany propertywhose value is based on geophysicalor other
70
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testsor upon expertappraisal,as withart objects. That in some English
auctions certain well-knownbuyers or dealers go to great lengths to
preservethe secrecyof theirbids suggeststhattheythinkthatthisinformation might affectothers' bidding. Cassady reports the incident in
which Norton Simon was bidding for Rembrandt's Titusin Christie's
auction house.87Simon had a writtenagreementthatstipulateda complicated set of biddingsignals.The auctioneergot lost in the procedure
and awarded the paintingto anotherbidder,beforebeing challengedby
Mr. Simon, who was indeed the high bidder. It is difficult
to understand
examples such as this, except in termsof some concept of positively
dependent values.88
Milgromand Weber providea formalanalysisof the effectof positivevalue dependence on the various standardauctions.89As one might
auctions' definingcharacteristics,
the English
expect fromthe different
auction's resultsare affectedwhen values are positivelydependent.The
effectincreases price, because as the bidding progresses,the natureof
the process compels people to reveal their(provisional)willingness-topay,whichmakesitpossible forothersto adjust theirpersonalvaluations,
and so on, untilthe process stops. Milgromand Weber also findthatthe
Dutch and first-price
auctions maintaintheirequivalence withpositively
dependent values, but the English and second-priceauctions no longer
remainequivalent institutions.
Fair market
valueand thestandardauctions.If the propertyat auction
is an OCS tractavailable for lease, then the value, vi, mightrepresent
each company'sestimateof thevalue of leasing thetract,giventhelease's
dimensions,such as the royaltyrate, and so forth.These values would
representthe object's value exantetherealizationof the uncertainfuture
variables,such as geological conditions,oil and gas prices,and so forth.
Referringto Figure 1, and assuming the independence of values, we
noticethatthereare naturaldefinitionsof severalof theconceptsof "fair
marketvalue" discussed earlier.90
If "fairmarketvalue" means the highestpossible paymentto the
government,thenitsachievementrequiresthatv, be paid to the government.But, we can expect none of the auctions discussed here to attain
thatgoal. Indeed, we knowof no auctionprocess or otherpricingmechanismthatwilldo so. A second definitionof"fairmarketvalue" discussed
earlieris thatthe governmentreceivesa paymentthatjust exhausts the
willingnessto pay of all losing bidders.91In terms of Figure 1, this
definitionrequires that the governmentreceive v,. Under the assumptions of this example, the second-priceand English auctions have the
theoreticallyderived property that all bidders fullyreveal demand.
Hence, the paymentto the governmentis predictedto be v2.
These two alternativeconceptsof "fairmarketvalue" are separated
the
amount (v - v2). This differencesuggestsanothernaturaldefiniby
tion of "fair marketvalue" to be f(v, + v2)/2,the midpointbetweenv,
and v2. The price f guaranteesan efficient
allocation,clears the market
71
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(onlyone buyerdesires the single available unitat thatprice),and splits
in the potentialseller revenuesthatseparates theprevious
the difference
two definitionsof "fair marketvalue."
Since v2 is the tract'sopportunitycost, we can also interpretthe
price f as splittingthe differencebetweenthe tract's(demand) value, v],
and its (opportunity)cost, v2. From our analysisof the four standard
auction and its theoreticalequivalent,the Dutch
auctions,the first-price
auction,mightcome closestin practiceto approximatingf by yieldinga
auctionthan
mean price near E(f). If pricesare higherin the first-price
in the second-priceor English auctions, because of risk-aversebidder
decision making,thenaverage prices near E(f) mayoccur. But, we know
of no auction or other pricing mechanismfor which the theoretically
predictedprice is necessarilyat or near E(f).
C. The Performanceof ExperimentalAuction Markets
We can easily reproduce the conditionsillustratedin Figure 1 in a
controlledlaboratoryexperiment.The procedure is to assign each of N
randomlygeneratedvalues, denominatedin dollars, to Ndistinctbuyer
subjects,withthe understandingthatthe winningbidder in any auction
will be paid the differencebetween the winner'sassigned value and the
price determinedin the auction. Hence, the subjects' incentivesin an
experimentalauction are identicalto the representationgiven in Figure
1 for any auction. For example, in Figure 1 if subject I withvalue v,
eventuallyannounces the finalbid, v,, thensubject 1 "earns," or is paid,
v, - v, dollars. If all participantsprefermore cash to less, then each i
will be motivatedto bid no higherthan v,. Thus, vi provides an upper
bound on i's willingnessto pay foran abstractobject in an experimental
auction. The most common experimentusing cash-motivatedsubjects
consists of a sequence of ten or more auctions, each with a different
random assignmentof values among the N subjects,witheach auction
guided by therules thatdefineone of the fourstandardauctions.92Since
the goal of the experimentis to test the Vickreyauction models, the
experimentalconditionsreproduceVickrey'sinformationand structural
assumptions.That is, each subject knowshis assigned value beforetendering a bid in each auction. And, each subject knows the probability
distributionfromwhichall values were drawn,but he does not knowthe
particularvalue that this procedure assigns to any other bidder. The
usual experimentis replicatedmore thanonce, witha different
group of
N subjects. Experimentsusing the same or distinctgroups, also of size
auction rules,allow the different
auction institutionsto
N, but different
be compared. VaryingN across experimentswith each of the auction
institutionsallows one to discernany effectsattributableto the number
of bidders.These are just the classical methods of experimentalscience
applied to the studyof auctions in whichthe treatmentvariablescan be
the numberof bidders,the institution(kindof auction), the distribution
of values providedto each person (each subject knowshis own value,and
the distributionfromwhichother values are drawn at random).
72
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Table 1 summarizesthe mean observed price forvariousvalues of
N, foreach of the fourstandardauctions.These data are based on a total
of 852 auctions conducted in 28 experimentalsessions. The Dutch-auction experimentsforN=8 in 'ITable1 are not comparablewiththe other
Dutch auctions,because theyare conducted under different
controlconditions.93These data supportthe conclusion thatEnglish-auctionprices
are below Dutch-auctionprices.Also, mean Dutch pricesare below those
in the first-price
auction,forall values of N studied. Finally,the lowest
mean prices occur in the second-price,sealed-bid auction. But, thislast
resultis somewhatmisleading,because thereis evidence thatover time
an increasingnumber of subjects in second-priceauctions submitbids
equal to theirrespectivevalues.94Hence, biddersappear to "learn" over
timethatit is in theirself-interest
to bid theirmaximumwillingness-topay. Except for the case in whichN=3 (Table 1), both Dutch-and firstprice-auctionmean prices are above Vickrey'srisk-neutralprediction,
whichis consistentwiththe hypothesisthatbiddersact as iftheyare risk
averse. Nevertheless,it also remainsclear thatin these experimentsthe
Dutch auctionis not equivalent,in termsof thesubjects' actualdecisions,
to thefirst-price
auction.Mean Dutch pricesare consistently
belowprices
in first-price
auctions, and thereforethe theoryof the Dutch auction,
which ignores the informationand technical differencesbetween the
Dutch and first-price
auctions, is deficient.
That mean Dutch and first-price
auction prices tend to be below
Vickrey'spredictionwhenthereare onlyN=3 bidderssuggeststhatsome
sort of tacitcollusion may occur; "tacit" is the rightword,because the
subjects could not communicateduringan experiment.We can offerno
otherexplanationof theseresults,whichdisappearwhen
N-4.
In Table 1,column5, curiosityled us to computethe
expectedvalue
of f = (v, + v2)12, which is well-definedby the treatmentconditionsof
thereportedexperiments.It turnsout thatunder the conditionsof these
auction,except,again, forthe case
particularexperiments,the first-price
of N=3, yieldsmean observedpricesthatappear remarkably
close to this
3,
concept of expected "fair marketvalue." In particular,for all N
expected fairmarketvalue is a betterpredictorof the mean price than
is Vickrey'sexpected risk-neutralprice.
We can obtain additionalinsightinto thecomparativeperformance
of the different
of our conclusions,
auctions,as well as a strengthening
fromthe efficiency
data reportedin Table 2. Efficiency
is measuredhere
as thepercentageof auctions,conductedaccordingto a givenset ofrules,
in whichthe award is to the bidder withthe highestvalue. Thus in the
Englishauctionsessions(N=8), 35 of the 36 auctions(97 percent)representedefficient
allocations.FromTable 2 we see thattheEnglishauction
shows the greatestefficiency,
withthe second-priceauction onlyslightly
less efficient
than the English auction. The first-price
and especiallythe
Dutch auctionsare considerablyless efficient
than eitherthe English or
the second-priceauctions.We note in particularthatan efficiency
order73
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Table 1.
Prices in Four Standard Auctions.

Numberof
Bidders,N
3
4
5
6
8a

9

Numberof
Experimental
GroupsofsizeN
7
4
4
7
2
4

Maximum
possible
Valueb,i.
$ 4.90
$ 8.10
$12.10
$16.90
$10.00
$36.10

Theoretical
Risk-Neutral
(Vickrey)
Price
$ 2.50
$ 4.90
$ 8.10
$12.10
$ 7.80
$28.90

Fair
Market
Valuec,E(f)
$ 3.10
$ 5.70
$ 9.10
$13.30
$ 8.35
$30.70

Mean O

English

$7.48 (36
-

aPrice data fromCoppinger, Smith& Titus, Incentives
and Behaviorin English,Dutchand Sealed-BidAu
and BehaviorofSingleObjectAucti
(1980). All otherprice data are fromCox, Roberson& Smith,Theory
1 (1982).
bThe minimumpossible value was $0.10 in all experiments.
C
Computed fromE(f) = [E(vl) + E(v2)]/2 = 0.10 + (2N 1)(i
0.10)/2(N + 1).
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Table 2.
Efficiency,Percentage Awards to Subject
with High~st Value.
Numberof
Bidders

English

Dutch

FirstPrice

SecondPrice

82
77
82
84
78
72

83
95
93
83

93
97

8"
9

97
-

83

90

Overall

97

80

88

94

3
4
5
6

aSee Table 1.

is almostthereverseof an orderingbased on price.
ing of theinstitutions
and Dutch auctions,whichyield the highestprices
Thus, the first-price
theEnglishand second-priceauctions,
to theseller,are theleast efficient;
whichprovide the lowest prices,are the most efficient.
These experimentalresultsprovide empiricalevidence of a direct
conflictbetweenefficiency
and price,in comparingthe variousstandard
auctions. No experimentalstudies have been made of the performance
of different
auctioninginstitutionsunder the informationand multipleunit-offer
conditionsof the OCS tracts.But, a reasonable conjectureis
thata similarconflictmay prevail in the OCS paradigm.
It is naturalto ask, "Why should the governmentworryabout the
auctions?"
of auctionsifit takesin more moneyfrominefficient
efficiency
The answeris thatthegovernmentneed not concernitselfwithefficiency
ifitsonlyobjectiveis to maximizeitsrevenuefromthesale ofOCS tracts.
But, as we interpretthe OCS legislation,the governmentstatesthatthe
goals ofOCS leasing includemaintainingcompetitionand promotingthe
timelydiscoveryand developmentof new oil and gas sources on OCS
lands.95An importantpropertyof competitivemarketsis thatresources
are allocated to theirhighest-valueduse. In thecase of OCS tracts,those
companies best able to profitfromthe discoveryand developmentof
particularOCS tractsare those forwhomsuch tractswillhave thehighest
value. Consequently,the government'sstatedgoals should include concernforwhetherthese tractsget allocated to thebiddersthatvalue them
most highly.But, as we findin the discussion of the standardauctions,
and incentive
information
ifthereis uncertainty
about value, thedifferent
kindsofauctioninstitutions
mayimplythattheless
propertiesofdifferent
efficient
auctions yield higherprices.96
Of course, this problem is mitigatedif there is free after-market
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primaryauction, a subsequent exexchange. That is, in an inefficient
allocation. But, the use of an after-market
change can yield an efficient
adds to the participants'cost of transacting.Also, if the government
chooses an inefficient
auctionmethodand subsequentlyobservesthatthe
winningbidder resells a tractto someone else at a higherprice,thenthe
governmentmust guard against concluding,fromthis evidence alone,
that there must have been a conspiracyin the primaryauction. The
experimentsthatwe describe provide no opportunityfor explicitcommunicationand thereforewithinthestructureof theexperimentsofferno
allocations
opportunityfor formalbidder agreements. Yet, inefficient
occur as a propertyof the incentiveand informationconditionsof the
Dutch-and first-price
auction institutions.If these resultsalso characterauction procedure thatis
ize OCS auctions,then perhaps the first-price
used provides a reasonable compromise between price and efficiency;
thatis, thisprocedure yields the highestaverage price,but it is not the
least efficientinstitution.
D. Informationand the Collusive Potentialof AlternativeAuctions
The theoryof auctionspreviouslysummarizedis a non-cooperative
theory,based on the hypothesisthat people act independentlyin the
sense of not actingin concertby tacitor explicitagreementto influence
the price or the allocation. Non-cooperativetheoryassumes thatpeople
willchoose bids thatare conditionalupon whatothersbid or are expected
to bid, but thatno bid or bids reflecttacitor explicitjoint agreements
among any of the participantbuyersor seller.
Because it is widelybelieved, oftenalleged, and sometimesdocumented that collusive buyer rings may influencean auctioned item's
standardauctionsin terms
price,it is importantto examine the different
of theirmanipulativepossibilities.97
Here, we discuss threekindsofcollusion: buyerrings,in whichtwo or more buyersenterinto an agreement
to act in concert;an agreementbetweenthe auctioneerand one or more
buyersto act in concert;and, manipulativeactions by the seller,in the
case of privateauctions,or in concertwiththe auctioneer,in the case of
organized public auctions.
Beforediscussingthemechanicsof colludingbuyerrings
Buyerrings.
and how the different
standardauctions mightaffecttheiroperation,a
fewgeneral observationsmayprovide some perspectiveon the issue. In
manyauctionsof single objects thatare offeredforsale, especiallypaintings and otherworksof art,the sellersare monopolists,who enjoyall of
theadvantagesordinarilythoughtto be theprivilegesof monopoly.Such
sellersare freeto offeror not to offerto sell, and ifthedecisionis to offer
forsale, thenthe seller is freeto choose any reservationprice (minimum
acceptable bid) thatis agreeable to the auction house. Given thismenu
of choice, for the monopolist to complain that buyers may sometimes
forma ringis a bitlikethefoxcomplainingabout farmerswho fencetheir
chickens.
76
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Indeed, buyerringsmayfunctionas a formof countervailingpower
to a seller's monopoly or monopoly-likedominance. Tacit collusion by
buyers,in whichdemand is withheld(under-revealed),has been documentedexperimentallyunder monopolypricing,withsuch buyercollusion found to be greatlyreduced if thereare two sellers.98Similarly,in
1980 theairlineswere reportedto have withheldordersforBoeing's new
757 jet, in the hope that McDonnell Douglas would elect to offera
competingjet in the same class.99 Although the governmentis not a
monopoly owner of oil- and gas-leasing rights,most of the remaining
unexploredpotentialoil- and gas-bearinglands are offshoreor on public
lands, whichconstituteover one-fourthof the land area of the United
States. Because of its choice of reservationprices and the time rate at'
whichit places leases at auction,the government'smarketpower seems
easily as great as thatof any bidder or any combinationof bidders.
Suppose that a subset of n buyers,such thatin N, agrees to act
- ring'smembers
cooperatively.If cooperation is to be achieved,all of the
mustagree on whichmemberis to receive the item;on the price-determiningbid to be enteredbyone of themembers,withall othersentering
"shill" (fake) bids designed to give the appearance of an open auction;
and on the compensationto be paid by the memberreceivingthe item
to theremainingn - 1 ringmembersin returnfortheirforbearance.An
agreementthisextensiverequires a cohesive group, such as mightexist
among a small group of antique dealers. The conditionsmost favorable
to the ringare thatthe ringincludes all or most of the bidders withthe
highestvalues, and thatthe itemwillbe resold by the receivingmember
of the group,say,at retailoutside of the group,or in an "open" auction
restrictedto the group, thusyieldinga well-definedarbitrageprofitthat
the ringmemberswill share.
Even under these conditionsif thereis insufficient
"honor among
thieves,"thenthe resellingdealer may sell the itemat a shillprice modestlyabove thering'spurchasecost and arrangea private"kickback." Or,
if the item is resold at "open" auction to the ring,then theremay be a
ringwithinthe ring.Plainly,the more successfulis a ring,the greateris
theincentivefora ringmemberor membersto exploittheagreementfor
privategain. To avoid this exploitation,the ring must devise effective
monitoringand enforcementprocedures.But,monitoringmaybe costly,
even if it is feasible, and punishmentby expelling a deviant member
merelyprovides the ring withone more externalcompetitor.
If conditionsare less favorable,a ringmayencountermore serious
If the ringdoes not include the highest-valuebidder,thenit
difficulties.
is almostcertainto be unsuccessfulin an Englishor second-priceauction.
But, it mayhave some chance of success in a Dutch or first-price
auction,
ifthehighest-valuebuyeris not veryriskaverseor is otherwisemotivated
to bid considerablybelow his value. If the ringincludesthehighest-value
buyers,say, the top two,but not the thirdhighest,then the ringcan be
assured of success only ifit adopts a bidding strategythatwill ensure a
77
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price at least as large as v, in Figure 1. Such a strategyis more likelyto
be devised in an Englishauction thanin any of the otherauctions.In an
Englishauction the ringmemberscould simplyagree not to bid against
each otherand to accept, as the ring's purchase cost, the highestnecessarybid. In our example member I or 2 will be the winnerat a price v,
or a little higher. In English auctions in which bidder anonymityis
preserved,an agreementamong ring membersnot to bid against each
otherrequiresall ringmembersto have common knowledgeof member
signalingcodes, and to be seated at auction so as to be able to read the
signals. This is an imposing task, because bidders normallyface the
auctioneer. 00
The Dutch and sealed-bid auctions make it impossiblefora ringto
use this kind of conditionalbidding strategy.With respect to the OCS
auctions,it is an open question whetherit is in the government'sinterest
to reveal thebids and identitiesof all bidders afteran auctionis completed. If a buyerringis operatingin OCS auctions, thensuch bid information makesit easier forthe ringto monitorits members'actions,to learn
who, when, where, and at what bids the ring lost to outsiders,and to
adjust the ring'sstrategiesaccordingly.From thisperspectivethe Dutch
auction is probablybest, because none of the losing bids are knownto
anyone,and theycannot even be leaked. In sealed-bid auctionsall bids
are knownby someone, and a policyof not publicizingbids means only
thatbid informationis not generallyavailable at zero cost.101Observationssuch as these should lead to an appreciationof the ingeniouscharacteristics that may be captured in the various standard auction
institutions,whose originsand circumstancesof birthare unknown.
Auctioneer
We mustmodifymostof theprecedand/orsellercollusion.
ing discussion if the auctioneer,as agent for the seller, is partyto an
agreementwithany buyeror ringof buyers.In the case of a ring,at an
English auction withbidder anonymitythe auctioneer merelycan feign
to have recognizedsignals fromthe floorwhen he is actuallyimplementing the ring's agreement that no member raise the bid of any other
member.But, the pivotal importanceof the auctioneerin thiscase sughe
gests thathis servicesare not likelyto be cheap. Indeed, theoretically
can extractmostof thering'sprofits,and no ringmemberis wellmotivated to punishtheauctioneerbyrevealinghis role to theauthorities.In the
case of sealed-bid auctions, a ringcould be secretlynotifiedof the bids
of nonmembers,withthe ring submittingnew replacementbids to the
auctioneer,who then "opens" the bids forpublic announcementof the
results. The terms of an agreement between any one buyer and the
auctioneerin a first-price
auction mightinclude thatif at any timethat
the
bid,
enters
thenthe auctioneerwillallow thatbuyerto
buyer
highest
resubmita new bidjust above the second-highestbid. Similarly,as Vickrey notes, the second-price auction is vulnerable to a "shill" bid just
below the top bid, to extracta higherprice fromthe top bidder.'02By
this device, if bidders all reveal maximumwillingnessto pay, then the
seller can extractthe maximumpossible surplus.
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This example raises anotherissue in connectionwiththe question
of whetherbids should be announced afteran auction,namelythe auction's institutionalcredibility.The advantage in thiscase of announcing
all bids, or at least the top two bids, is thatbidders can verifythattheir
bids are processed honestly,and hence theirbidding strategiesdo not
have to includean additionalsource of strategicuncertainty
growingout
of potentialfraud.
E. CombinatorialAuctions
The combinatorialauctionis a sealed-bidauctionin whichindividual bidderscan submitbids forone or more combinationsof nonidentical
itemsin a multiple-unitauction.103In a combinatorialOCS auction, in
whichmanytractsare offeredat auction,a bidderwhose testinformation
suggeststhatthreeparticularcontiguoustractshave thebest prospectfor
a petroleumdiscoverycould entera bid on the three-tract
package and
also submitbids fortheindividualtracts,ifhe so desired.The threetracts
may have a combined value to the bidder thatexceeds the sum of the
component tractsvalued in isolation, perhaps because of the greater
the character
that the combined tractsprovide in identifying
flexibility
and extentof the geological structureon whichpreliminarytests have
been conducted.The combinatorialauction procedurealso permitsbidders to entervariousconditionalbids. For example, these mightinclude
a bid forthe package of tractsA, B, and C, and a bid forthe package D
and E, but withtheunderstandingthateitherbut not both can be accepted; or, theymightinclude a bid fortractsA, B, and C, and for D and E,
and forF, withthetotaldollar amountof theaccepted bids not to exceed
some limitthatthebidderspecifies.Ifcombinationvalues exceed thesum
of componentvalues, then only the combinatorialprocedureallows the
efficient
bids to reflectthe offering'sfullpotentialvalue, thusfacilitating
allocation.
The allocationof tractsamong biddersin thecombinatorialauction
requiresa computeralgorithmthatcould make awards,to maximizethe
offering'stotal surplus,as the bids reveal under a procedure in which
winningbidders pay less than the amounts bid (as in the second-price,
sealed-bid auction). Or, the algorithmcould make awards, to maximize
the seller's total revenue,as determinedby the bids under a procedure
in whichwinningbidderspay theamountbid, as in thefirst-price,
sealedbid auction.Whichallocationprocedureactuallyyieldshigherrevenueto
theselleris an empiricalquestion thathas not yetbeen examinedexperimentally,but we expect the firstprocedure,maximizingtotalsurplus,to
be more efficient
thanthesecond, maximizingtotalrevenue,because the
firstprovidesbetterincentivesfordemand revelation.Since biddershave
an incentiveto bid higher under the firstprocedure than under the
second, thesecond would not necessarilyyieldthegreaterrevenueto the
seller.But,experimentscomparingcombinatorialauctionsusingthefirst
procedurewithnoncombinatorialauctionshave been conducted,and the
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results show that the combinatorialauction yields the highestefficiency.104

If the totalvalue of tractsin theOCS auction is significantly
greater
in package combinationsthan in separate components,then the combinatorialauction institutionmay be the most importantalternativeto
currentprocedures thatthe governmentmightconsider. The extentof
after-market
exchange in past OCS auctions thatinvolvedthe assembly
ofindividualtractawardsintopackages,or theextentofjointexploration
and development contractingamong the winners of differenttracts,
would provide partialevidence of interdependenttractvalues.
Because the bids have informationvalue to the other bidders, a
researchquestion of some interestis whetherthe combinatorialsealedbid auction should be modifiedto allow individualbids to be tendered
thatare conditionalupon otherbids. For example,companyA mightwish
to bid $100 millionfora particularcombinationof tracts,withthecondition thatthe bid be raised to $110 millionifany other companybids on
thesame combination,or ifanyoneelse bids more than$100 million,and
so on. Of course, such a conditional increase in one's bid is always
possible in the Englishauction.Would such conditionalbids increaseor
diminishthe efficiency
of primaryauction allocations? Would theyincrease or diminishrevenue to the seller?These are among theimportant
research questions, along with the question of how the combinatorial
auction compares withthe currentpracticeof simultaneousbiddingfor
separate tracts.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The 1978 Amendmentsto the OCS Lands Act providean example
of the kind of legislation that economists find interesting,because it
authorizesthecreationof some new marketinstitutions.
These new institutionsare the nine auctions authorizedforuse in selling federalleases
on OCS tracts,as alternativesto the traditionalcash-bonus-bid,fixedlease auction.Of furtherinterest,thelegislationrequiresthe
royalty-rate
use of some of the new auctions,withinbroadlyspecifiedpercentagesof
lease sales, and itrequirestheSecretaryof theInteriorto reportregularly
to Congress on the performanceof those newlyauthorizedauctionsthat
he uses. In this way, the 1978 Amendmentsrequire the Secretaryto
conduct a fieldexperimentin auction-marketperformance.
The plaintiffs
in Energy
Actionalleged, interalia, thatthe Secretary
abused his discretionin not using any of the newlyauthorizedauctions
that provide for bidding on variables other than the size of the cash
bonus. We can interpretthisclaimas an allegationthattheSecretarywas
subvertingthe legislation'sintentand biasing the mandatedfieldexperiment's conclusions by not using any of the auctions that provide for
bidding on the downstreampaymenttermsof leases.
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Section II analyzed some propertiesof all ten of the authorized
auctions.105It began by observingthe inverserelationshipbetweenthe
size of theup-frontpaymentand theexpecteddownstreampaymentsthat
can be obtained on a lease on any givenOCS tract.Furthermore,
higher
front-endlease paymentslead to a smallernumberof separate bidding
entitiescapable of bearingthe riskof such payments.In addition,higher
downstreampayments,in relationto downstreamproductionrevenues,
can implya disincentivefor efficientexploration and development of
leased tracts.Hence, one possible interpretationof the basic issue of
economic policyunderlyingthe legal issues in Energy
is an implicit
Action
relative
over
of
the
the
numberof
disagreement
importance increasing
lease-auctionbiddersversuspromotingefficiency
in the explorationand
developmentof leased tracts.
The theoreticalanalysisin Section II impliesthatsome of thenewly
authorizedauctions contain lease provisionsthatwould undermineefficiency in explorationand development of leased tracts.06 Hence, the
Secretarymay have been well advised in not using them. Finally,the
theoreticalanalysisimpliesthatthenet-profit-share
auctionsare themost
promisingfor increasingthe relativesize of downstreampaymentson
leases, whilediminishingthe relativesize of up-frontpayments,without
introducingserious disincentivesforefficient
explorationand development of leased tracts.'07
Theoreticalanalysisby itselfcannotprovidesatisfactory
answersto
about
auction
it
is
Thus,
questions
comparative
performance.
encouraging thatCongress soughtempiricaldata on auctionperformance.But,as
Section III pointed out, thereare serious methodologicalproblemsthat
arise in conductingfieldexperiments,to compare thepropertiesof alternative OCS-lease auctions.10sWe contrastthe requirementsof a controlled experimenton auctions withthe field conditionsin OCS lease
auctionsand conclude thatthereis not sufficient
controlof determining
variables to permitthe derivationof valid empiricalanswers to some
centralquestions. We thenargue thatcontrolledlaboratoryexperiments
on auction marketswould provide useful complementsto fieldexperiments,and that laboratorytechniques would have several advantages
over virtuallyany feasible fieldexperiment.
As Section IV explains,thereis a richbodyofworkinvolvinglaboratorytestsof some hypothesesof auctionperformance.'09
Althoughthere
are some differences
betweentheauctionenvironmentsthathave already
been tested in the laboratoryand the environmentof the authorized
alternativeprocesses applied to OCS auctions,thisliteratureis enlightening nevertheless.It demonstratesthatauction rules do matter.It highsealed-bid rule common to the
lightssome propertiesof the first-price,
traditionaland alternativeOCS auctions, compared withkinds of auctions not mentionedin the 1978 Amendments.And finally,the existing
workdemonstratestheabilityof thisrelativelynew researchtechniqueto
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address preciselythe kinds of economic issues that the 1978 Amendmentsand Energy
Actionraised.
NOTES
1. 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
2. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 etseq.(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

3. It would be impossible to provide here a complete bibliographyon auctionsand
on experimentalmethodsin economics.The followingreferencesare good primarysources
with extensive bibliographic information:R. CASSADY,AUCTIONSAND AUCTIONEERING
and Competitive
(1967); Milgrom& Weber, A TheoiyofAuctions
Bidding,50 ECONOMETRICA
1089 (1982); and Smith, Microeconomic
as an Experimental
72 AM.ECON.REV.
Science,
Systems
923 (1982).
4. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 etseq. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
5. EnergyAction Educ. Found. v. Andrus,479 F. Supp. 62 (D.D.C. 1979).
6. EnergyAction Educ. Found. v. Andrus,631 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
7. 454 U.S. at 168-69.
8. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
9. The Court's decision also at one pointcalls theSecretary'stask"experimentation"
and mentions several times the requirementsthat the Secretaryreport periodicallyto
Congress. 454 U.S. at 162-65.
10. See infranotes 11-13 and accompanyingtext.
11. 43 U.S.C. ? 1332(3)-1332(4) (Supp. IV 1980).

12. 43 U.S.C. ? 1344(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).

13. H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978).

14. See,e.g.,454 U.S. at 162, 164, 165.
15. 43 U.S.C. ? 1344(a)(4) (Supp.IV 1980).
16. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

17. Id. ? 1331(o) (Supp. IV 1980).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1424, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-79 (1978).
19. See43 U.S.C. ? 1331(c) (Supp. IV 1980), and H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 78 (1978).
20. Id.
ofcongressionalintentwas suggestedbyreferees
21. The "generous" interpretation
of an earlier draftof thisessay and is based on H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
79 (1978), in which the conferees state, "This term [fair marketvalue] as defined in
subsection(o), is onlyused in thisact in relationto the purchaseand distributionof oil and
gas under section 27." Our skepticismthat one can thus eliminate any idea of ex post
valuation fromcongressional intentis based on two arguments.First, the "generous"
interpretationof thispassage leaves the keyphrase "fairmarketvalue" undefinedforthe
parts of the legislation concerningleases. Second, the section of the same Conference
Report concerning the "fair marketvalue" of leases makes it clear that the Senate had
preciselythis expostvantage point. The Report reads:
Both [the House and Senate versionsof thebill] containas a considerationof a leasing
program,thereceiptofvalue forlands. The House Amendmentprovidesthatactivities
are to be conducted to assure receiptof "fairvalue forthe lands leased and the rights
conveyedby the Federal Government."The Senate bill providesforleasing activities
to be conducted to assure receiptof "fairmarketvalue forthe oil and gas owned by
the Federal Government."The Conference Report follows the House amendment
withthe addition of the term"market"so as to read "fairmarketvalue forthe lands
leased and the rightsconveyed by the Federal Government."Id. at 103.
Furthermore,.the respondents"complainedthatbonus biddingcannotgenerateadequate
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competitionto yielda fairmarketreturnforOCS oiland gas as required
bythe1978 Amend454 U.S. at 158 (emphasisadded).
ments."
22. Many of these times the term's use is in a quotation froma congressional
committeereport.In additionto the quotationin supranote 21, the Court's opinionquotes
S. REP. No. 284, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 46-47, 73 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 47, 54, 138-39 (1977); and H.R. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978).
See454 U.S. at 162 n.14, 164 n.16, 166 n.18.
23. Refereesof an earlierdraftof thisessay pointedout thatthe federalgovernment
does not own all possible oil and gas leases. Furthermore,the value of oil and gas leases
is criticallydependent upon the expected price path of the resources, and the federal
governmentis nota monopolistin thesemarkets.We do notbelieve thattheseare sufficient
conditionsto ensure thatthefederalgovernment,as a consequence, facesa perfectly
elastic
demand forOCS leases.
24. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1977). The fullquotation is: "To
increasecompetitionforoff-shoreleases and secure higherreturnsto the publicTreasury,
section8 oftheOuter ContinentalShelfLands Acthas been amended to allow theSecretary
to use other bidding methods based on net profits;royalty;or workcommitmentsstated
in dollar amounts." Quotedin 454 U.S. at 167 n.18.
25. The Court held that"[i]n allegingthatthebiddingsystemscurrently
used by the
Secretaryof the Interiorare incapable of producinga fairmarketreturn,Californiaclearly
assertsthe kindof 'distinctand palpable injury'thatis required forstanding."454 U.S. at
161 (citationomitted) (quoting Warthv. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
26. See infratextaccompanyingnotes 38-51.
27. See,e.g.,Cox, Roberson & Smith, Theoty
and BehaviorofSingleObjectAuctions,2
RESEARCH
IN EXPERIMENTALECON. 1 (1982); Forsythe& Isaac, DemandRevealing
Mechanisms
2 RESEARCHIN EXPERIMENTALECON.45 (1982); and Vickrey,CounterforPrivateGoodAuctions,
and Competitive
Sealed Tenders,
Auctions,
speculation,
16 J. FIN. 8 (1961).
28. See infratextaccompanyingnotes 72-96.
29. See infratextaccompanyingnotes 74-85.
30. The Court noted that "(t]he Secretaryof the Interiorhas not experimented,
however,withanyof thesystemsusinga factorotherthanthesize of a cash bonus as bidding
variable."454 U.S. at 157 (emphasisoriginal)(footnoteomitted).And,itargued that"[t]he
essence of California'scomplaint. . . is thatthe Secretaryof the Interior,by failingto test
non-cash-bonussystems,has breached a statutory
obligationto determinethroughexperimentwhichbidding systemworksbest." 454 U.S. at 161.
31. See,e.g.,Reece, Competitive
Petroleum
Leases,9 BELLJ.ECON.369
Biddingfor
Offshore
(1978), and Wilson,A BiddingModelofPerfect
44 REV.EcON. STUD. 511 (1977).
Competition,
32. SeeMilgrom& Weber, supranote 3.
33. SeeJ.Cox & R. M. Isaac, In Search for the Winner's Curse (1983) (Discussion
paper, Universityof Arizona Dept. of Economics).
34. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1977).
35. SeeWilson, supranote 31.
36. Here, we abstractfromthe differential
income-taxtreatmentof the write-off
of
lease bonuses forproductiveand relinquishedleases. As a reader of an earlierdraftof this
tax treatmentsare applied to thewrite-off
of thebonus, dependessaypointedout,different
ing on the productionrate if the tractis developed or the abandonmentrate if the lease
is relinquishedduringthediligenceperiod. Because a similarargumentapplies to developmentcosts,a substantialamount of risksharingdoes fallon the government,even in pure
cash-bonusbidding under currentincome-taxlaw.
37. These problemsare explored in Forsythe& Isaac, supranote 27, and in Rassenti,
Smith& Bulfin,A Combinatorial
TimeSlotAllocation,
AuctionMechanism
13 BELLJ.
forAirport
ECON. 402 (1982). See also infratextaccompanyingnotes 103-104.
38. SeeReece, supranote 31, and Smith,Non-Aggressive
BiddingBehaviorand the"Win" 19 ECON. INQUIRY 380 (1981).
ner'sCurse,
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39. 45, Fed. Reg. 9,536 (1980).
40. The GNP fixed-weight
price index is an index of the prices of all goods and
servicesthatcomprisethe GNP. The fixedweightsthatare currentlyapplied to prices are
1972 expenditureshares in GNP. The index is regularlypublished in U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF

COMMERCE,

BUREAU OF ECONOMIC( ANAIYSIS,

SURV. OF CURRENT Bus.

41. 45 Fed. Reg. 36,784 (1980).
42. Accountingprocedures for calculatingexpenses and profitsare set out in 10
C.F.R. 390 (1983).
43. 45 Fed. Reg. 9,536 (1980).
44. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,680 (1981).
45. Accountingprocedures for calculatingexpenses and profitsare set out in 10
C.F.R. 390 (1983).

46. 46 Fed. Reg. 35,614(1981).

47. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 etseq. (1976).

48. 43 U.S.C. ? 1331 etseq.(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

49. "Risk" refersto uncertainreturns,whetherpositiveor negative.Thus, ifpartof
thepaymentto thegovernmentis a contingentroyaltypayment,thenthegovernmentbears
some of the riskassociated withthe lease's uncertainvalue.
50. 10 C.F.R. 390 (1983).
51. The OCS Lands Act gives the Secretaryof the Interiorthe authorityto reduce
to zero the royaltyrate on leases sold withthe traditionalauction, to encourage high-cost
production. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(3) (Supp. IV 1980). But, to date the Secretaryhas not
exercised this authorityon active leases, presumablybecause of the administrativeand
politicalproblems thathe would encounter.
52. "Through the 1978 Amendments,Congress sought to experimentwithalternatives to the traditionalbidding system."454 U.S. at 154.
53. Notingin Section II the listof undesirablepropertiesof the work-commitmentbid auction,one is temptedto speculate thatthese propertiescould have led the Secretary
to bypass that categoryof auction in fulfillingthe congressional directive.See supratext
accompanyingnotes 46, 51-52.
54. For example, one investigationof alternativemethodsof airport-slotallocation
combineseconomic theory,fielddata, and experimentaldata. SeeGrether,Isaac & Plott,The
71 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (1981).
Allocation
ofLandingRightsbyUnanimity
AmongCompetitors,
55. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
56. 43 U.S.C. ? 1337(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1980).
57. Firms also make selection decisions even when only one auction process is
offered.That is, ifall tractsare offeredusing auction process A, some firmswillchoose not
to bid at all. And, if all tractsare offeredusing auction process B, some firms,although
perhaps not the same set, will choose not to bid at all. The set of bidders is an important
propertyof an auction,and findingout the natureof theirdecisions does not constitutea
"bias." But, ifthe fieldexperiment'srandomizingrequirementsimplythatauctionsA and
B will be used concurrentlyto test whichone should be used in the future,self-selection
bias between the two kinds can determinethe experiment'sresults.The sets of bidders
when A and B are offeredconcurrentlywill not necessarilymatch the selection decisions
when only one of the two auction processes is available.
58. See,e.g.,the workscited supranotes 3, 27.
59. We can capturein the laboratorythe decisions of firmsto bid or not to bid when
onlyone auction process is available, seesupranote 57, whileeliminatingthe inter-auction,
self-selectionbiases. Of course, if one were interestedin a multiple-auctionenvironment
in whichself-selectionbetween different
kinds of auctions is a relevantfeature,then we
could also provide forthissortof variationin the laboratory.The keyaspect is thecontrol
and flexibility
of laboratoryexperimentsin determiningthe selection decisions thatare
available.
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60. For a comprehensivediscussion of many differentauction methodsand their
historyand uses, see R. CASSADY, Supranote 3.
61. Id. at 26.
62. Id. at 28.
63. Id. at 60-61.
64. See infratextaccompanyingnotes 83-85.
65. Vickrey,supranote 27, at 20.
66. R. CASSADY, supranote 3, at 152-53.
67. Vickrey,supranote 27, at 21.
68. R. CASSADY, supranote 3, at 71.
69. Id. at 71. R. CASSADY cites Rex v. Taylor, M'Cle. 362, 148 E.R. 141 (1824), in
whichthisscheme was used.
70. See infra text accompanyingnotes 86-89.
71. To illustratethese commentsfurther,
imaginean auction in whichtwo itemsare
offeredforsale, a new Cadillac and a new Chevrolet.Everyoneknowswhichitemis being
offered.If all would be willingto pay more forthe Cadillac, thenthis preference,isconsistentwiththesecond assumption,as long as no one is willingto pay more,because of what
some otherbidder is willingto pay. Now, suppose thata "blind" auction is conducted,in
whichthe itemis guaranteedto be eithera Cadillac or a Chevrolet,and thatsome bidders
know thatthe car is white,and othersknow thatit is a four-doorsedan. Further,suppose
thatit is knownthatCadillacs are much more likelyto be whitethan are Chevrolets,and
thatCadillacs are slightlymore likelyto be four-doorsedans thanare Chevrolets.Clearly,
each bidder's willingnessto pay forthe "blind" itemwillnow depend on whichof the two
kinds of informationhe possesses and on his assessment of the relevantprobabilities.
Furthermore,knowingthat some other person is willingto pay more suggests that that
person has betterinformation(whiteversusfour-door)or a betterassessmentof the information'simplications.The OCS auction is like this"blind" auction in thatthe characteristics of the auctioned itemare unknown,but theycan be estimatedimperfectly,
based on
information
thatis obtainable.The theoryof auctionswiththeseinformation
characteristics
has been studied (see,e.g.,J.RAMSEY,BIDDING ANDOIL LEASES(1980)), but thistheory,and
the performanceof such auctions,has yetto be subjected to an experimentalexamination
similarto thatwhichhas been applied to the standardauctions.
72. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 26-29.
73. That price and efficiencyconsiderationsmay be in conflictimplies that the
government'sgoal of maximizingrevenue (to providea "fair" returnto thepublic) maybe
in conflictwith maintainingor increasing competition,since efficiencyis an important
attributeof competitiveoutcomes.
74. See iinfra
textaccompanyingnotes 94-96.
75. An "after-market
exchange" is one thatis immediatelymotivatedby the results
of theprimaryauction.Furtherexchanges long aftertheprimaryauctionare likely,because
ofnew information
values,but theyprovidelittleconcreteevidenceof inefficiency.
affecting
76. See infratextaccompanyingnotes 103-104.
77. To the extentthatthe governmentdesires to promoteOCS competitionand its
concomitantefficiency
of allocation, after-market
exchange should be welcomed. To the
extentthatthe government'sobject is to maximizerevenue fromthe sale of OCS leases,
after-market
exchange impliesthatthe primaryauctioncapturesless than the full-revenue
potential.But ofcourse, itmaynot be possible to design an auction thatmaximizesrevenue
and thatis also always efficient.
78. Mathematically,
we can illustratethe effectof riskaversionthus:let the utilityof
the surplus, v-b, to a winningbidder be (v-b)', such that0
1. If r= 1, then the
r< bidder. If
bidder is risk neutral. The smaller is r, the more riskaverse is the
G(b) is the
probabilitythat a bid in the amount of b will win, then the bidder's expected utilityis
U(b) = (v - b)G(b). If r= 1, thentheoptimalbid,at whichthederivativeU'(b) = 0, occursat a
value forb,such that(v - b)G'(b)= G(b); thatis, the bid equates the expected marginalgain
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fromthe increasedchance of winningwiththe expected marginalloss of surplus. If r < 1,
then the optimalbid occurs at a value forb such that(v - b)G'(b)/r=G(b). Consequently,the
effectof increased riskaversion(decreased r) is to increasethe relativevalue (utility)of the
expected marginalgain, and thisincreases the optimalbid. The more riskaverse a bidder,
the greateris the subjectiveweightgiven to the marginalgain froman increased chance
of winningin the trade-off
betweenthisgain and themarginalloss in surplus,and thusthe
greateris the bid thatbalances these two components.
79. Vickrey,supranote 27, at 16-17, 20, 29-30.
80. Cox, Roberson & Smith,supra note 27, at 10-13.
81. SeeK. BOULDING,
42 (rev. ed. 1948), and R. CASSADY
, supra
ECONOMICANALYSIS
note 3, at 67.
82. Seesupranote 78. In the Dutch auction it is optimalto stop the clockat the price
b, such that (v - b)G'(b)/r=G(b),and thereforeone's bid "should" be the same as in a firstprice auction.
83. SeeCox, Roberson & Smith,supra note 27, at 6-8; Milgrom& Weber,supranote
3, at 1095; and Vickrey,supranote 27, at 20.
84. See Vickrey,supranote 27, at 20.
in contrastwithsupra note 78, surplus to the winningbidderis
85. Mathematically,
v - x, such that x is the (uncertain)second highestbid. If F(x) is a person's subjective
probabilitythatthe second highestbid is less than or equal to x, then the expected utility
froma bid of b is U(b)=b (v - x)rdF(x).Theoptimalbid b muststisfy U'(b)= (v - b)F'(b)= 0,
whichimpliesthatv- b= 0, or b= v,provided thatthe bidder bdlievesthatincreasingb will
increase the probabilitythatthebid b willwin; thatis,F'(b)>O. Noticein particularthatthis
resultis independentof r; it is also independentof the utilityfunctionand itonlyrequires
the assumption that"more (surplus) is better"forthe bidder.
86. As in Cox, Roberson & Smith,supranote 27, at 10-12.
87. R. CASSADY,
supranote 3, at 150-51.
88. R. CASSADY,
Id. cites other examples, as in Conoverv. Walling,15 N.J. Eq. 173,
179 (1852).
89. Milgrom& Weber, supranote 3, at 1095, 1100-1111.
90. See supratextaccompanyingnotes 14-29 & n.21.
91. See supratextaccompanyingnotes 28-29.
92. Seethedescriptionsof theexperimentalproceduresin Coppinger,Smith& Titus,
and Behavior
inEnglish,DutchandSealed-BidAuctions,
Incentives
18 EcoN. INQUIRY 1,4-5, 12-13
(1980), and in Cox, Roberson & Smith,supranote 27, at 14-20, 34-42.
93. For example, the payoffpotentialper subject was lower,the Dutch-pricedecrementlarger,and the speed of price decline much slower than in the otherDutch auctions.
94. Coppinger, Smith & Titus, supranote 92, at 19.
95. 43 U.S.C. ? 1332(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
96. See supratextaccompanyingnotes85-92.
97. See R. CAssAmi; supra note 3, at 179-92, forseveral citationsinvolvingantiques,
fish,timber,and wool.
98. D. Coursey,R. Isaac & V. Smith,NaturalMonopolyand theContestableMarkets
ofArizona
Hypothesis:Some ExperimentalResults33 (1982) (Discussion paper, University
Dept. of Economics).
99. Zonana, Boeing'sSale to Delta GivesIt Big Advantage
overU.S. Competitors,
Wall St.
J., November 13, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
100. The originof the term"ring" appears to be thatin "knockdown"sales in which
the conspiringbuyersresell the itemto one of theirgroup, the membersformeda circle,
or "ring," around theirleader or organizerto facilitatethe surveillanceof each memberby
the others, and thus to assure an open after-market
auction for determiningthe ring's
profitsfromthe agreement,See R. CASSADY, supranote3, at 177,182-83.
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101. But, as we note earlier,announcementof the winningbid facilitatesan efficient
Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes
after-market
exchangeif the originalaward is inefficient.
75-77, 96-97.
102. Vickrey,supranote 27, at 22.
103. See Rassenti,Smith& Bulfin,supranote 37, whichproposes the combinatorial
auction and examines its performancecharacteristicsusing experimentalmethods.
104. Id. at 407-412.
105. See supratextaccompanyingnotes 38-52.
106. See supratextaccompanyingnotes 49-52.
107. See supratextaccompanyingnotes 49-51.
108. See supratextaccompanyingnotes 55-58.
109. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 92-96.
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